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BANKRUPTCY AND MORTGAGE LENDING: 
THE HOMEOWNER DILEMMA 
A. MECHELE DICKERSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Homeownership: perhaps the symbol of the good life in 
America, undeniably the key to achieving the "American Dream," 
and a large component of household wealth. While houses most 
commonly serve as shelter, they also serve as a forced savings 
device. Homeowners can, however, "withdraw" their savings and 
use the cash they built up in their homes if they need money to 
help them survive a financial crisis. Because financial crises often 
harm homeowners' credit histories, they often find that they must 
borrow against the equity in their homes in the higher rate (and 
fee) subprime mortgage market. 
That borrowers with blemished credit must pay higher rates 
and fees when they seek credit is reasonable, given the higher 
risks generally posed by this type of lending. Because, however, 
most subprime loans are home equity or refinance loans that 
decrease homeowner wealth while increasing their debts, and 
refinance loan proceeds increasingly are used to pay off credit card 
debts or to pay for non-housing goods and services, refinance 
borrowers essentially are putting their homes at risk to pay for the 
things inside their homes or in their driveways. The refinance 
market is, sadly, turning the American Dream into a nightmare 
for many cash-strapped households. 
This Article argues that refinance loans presumptively should 
be treated differently than purchase money loans in bankruptcy. 
Part I of the Article discusses the American Dream of 
homeownership and chronicles recent efforts to increase 
homeownership rates, especially among minority and lower 
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income households. This Part then generally describes prime and 
subprime purchase money and home equity lending and notes the 
dramatic increase in subprime home equity lending. Part II 
explores how the American Dream has turned into the American 
Nightmare because of predatory practices involving some 
subprime lenders. This Part begins by discussing the types of loan 
products and lending practices that most often are characterized 
as predatory or abusive, and then describes legislative responses 
to predatory lending. This Part concludes by presenting lenders' 
objections to those consumer protection laws and their alternative 
proposals to curb predatory lending practices. 
Part III contrasts the treatment of mortgage debt with other 
types of non-purchase money consumer debt in bankruptcy cases. 
Mortgage debt is favorably treated in bankruptcy cases because 
the Code (like other state and federal laws) encourages 
homeownership. To protect lenders who enable borrowers to buy 
homes, the Code requires mortgage debt to be paid before other 
claims and protects the mortgage holder's lien during the 
bankruptcy case. In contrast, unsecured consumer claims are 
dischargeable, absent allegations of fraud, and some non-purchase 
money secured claims can be avoided in bankruptcy and be treated 
instead like a general unsecured claim. 
Part IV concludes by suggesting that refinance and home 
equity loans are functionally equivalent to non-purchase money, 
non-mortgage consumer finance loans since these loans do not help 
borrowers increase their wealth. Given this, all refinance and 
home equity loans should be treated as general unsecured debt in 
bankruptcy unless they are used for housing purposes or reduce 
the borrower's overall housing debt. In addition, the home equity 
or refinance lender should have its lien stripped in bankruptcy and 
be viewed as a creditor holding an unsecured claim. 
II. THE AMERICAN DREA.l\1:: HOMEOWNERSHIP 
A. Benefits and Beneficiaries of the Dream 
Research indicates that homeowners feel better about 
themselves, maintain better and safer neighborhoods, and live in 
neighborhoods that have better schools.! In addition to these 
1. See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on 
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 857 (1996) (hereinafter Orfield, 
Metropolitan School Desegregation] ("A good home in a good neighborhood and 
higher education are the primary dreams of American families .... ");GEORGE 
S. MASNICK, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., 
HOMEOWNERSHIP TRENDS AND RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE 20TH CENTURY 9 (2001) (discussing studies); J. MICHAEL COLLINS ET AL., 
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., TOWARDS A TARGETED 
HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX CREDIT 3·4 (1998) (discussing studies). 
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psychological and societal benefits, homeownership almost always 
is financially beneficial. Home equity is a significant component of 
household wealth and, for most lower-income and minority 
families, is the primary component of their net worth.2 Moreover, 
owning a home can be a mitigating factor when a homeowner 
suffers economic misfortunes because owners can borrow against 
their home equity to pay living expenses (if their income declines 
or they incur unexpected expenses) or to payoff higher interest 
existing debt.s While 68% of total households participated in the 
American Dream of homeownership in 2002,4 there is 
unfortunately a stubborn racial and economic disparity in 
homeownership rates. 
Due to concerted efforts by the federal government to bolster 
low income and minority homeownership rates,s minorities 
constituted more than 40% of the net growth in homeownership 
2. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE 
NATION'S HOUSING 2003, at 6-7 [hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 
2003]; TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS AMERICANS IN 
DEBT 233-34 (1999). See also Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its 
Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer 
Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (prepared statement of Anthony 
M. Yezer) (stating that medium income households owning homes hold 0% of 
their wealth in common stocks and "virtually all" in home equity and 
government-guaranteed assets); John Karl Scholz & Kara Levine, U.S. Black· 
White Wealth Inequality: A Survey at 42 (2002) (noting that homes constitute 
a larger portion of minority household wealth), available at 
http://www.russellsage.org/programs/proj_reviews/silrevscholzlevine01.pdf. 
3. Owners who need to radically reduce living expenses can always sell the 
home, use the equity to reduce existing debts, then rent less expensive 
housing. White homeowners are more secure financially than white renters 
and are less likely to file for bankruptcy than white renters. Elizabeth 
Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 
61 WASH. & LEE LAW REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2005) (manuscript at 17, on file 
with author). In contrast, blacks appear to increase their risk of filing for 
bankruptcy by being a homeowner because unlike white homeowners, black 
homeowners are more likely to file for bankruptcy than black renters. Id. 
4. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 15. 
5. Raisa Bahchieva, Susan Wachter & Elizabeth Warren, Mortgage Debt, 
Bankruptcy and the Sustainability of Homeownership, Credit Markets for the 
Poor 11 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing 
incentives the government provides to lenders to encourage them to loan to 
lower- and middle·income households). For example, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and the FHA all adopted initiatives designed to increase homeownership 
generally and minority homeownership specifically. These initiatives included 
lowering down payment requirements, recognizing multiple income sources to 
qualify for a housing loan, providing loan documentation in Spanish, and 
conducting fair housing audits of lender practices to combat realtors and 
lenders' racially discriminatory marketing and lending practices. MASNICK, 
supra note 1, at 10. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A 
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1255, 1276-77 (2002) (discussing federal initiatives in the 1990s to 
increase lending to low and middle·income borrowers). 
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during the 1990s and the growth in loans to minorities increased 
at rates more than double the growth in loans to potential white 
home buyers.6 However, while homeownership rates for whites in 
2002 was almost 75%, the ownership rates for blacks was 49%-
an increase for blacks of only 6% over the last decade. 7 The 
homeownership rates for other minority groups also lag the white 
homeownership rate, with Hispanics having a 4 7% rate, Asians 
having a 54% rate,8 and Native Americans having rates of 
approximately 34%.9 Indeed, while most white households have 
owned their homes since the end of World War II, the majority of 
black and Hispanic households still has not yet reached this 
level.1° 
Because 86% of high-income households own their own homes 
as opposed to only 45% of lower-income households and minority 
household income is lower than white household income, income 
no doubt contributes to the racial homeownership gap,ll Median 
white household income in 2002 ($47,000) is higher than the 
median household income for all races ($43,000), is higher than 
median Hispanic household income ($34,000), and is significantly 
higher than median black household income ($30,000).12 In 
addition, blacks are almost twice as likely to be lower-income 
(51%) than whites (28%), and twice the number of white workers 
(32%) earn over $75,000 annually as black workers (16%).13 
6. See JOSEPHINE LOUIE ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., THE HOUSING NEEDS OF LOWER-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 16 
(1998) (reporting that minority home buyers contributed 42% of the growth in 
homeowners between 1994 and 1997 but were only 15% of all homeowners 
before that growth); MARK DUDA & ERIC S. BELSKY, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. 
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE ANATOMY OF THE LOW-INCOME 
HOMEOWNERSHIP BOOM IN THE 1990S 1 (2001) (noting that minorities 
constituted 19.1% of first-time buyers in 1993 but 30% in 1999); ld. at 2 
(reporting that growth in loans to white home buyers was 42% in contrast to 
98% growth rate in loans to black buyers and 125% growth rate to Hispanic 
buyers); STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 15 (reporting 
that minorities constituted 32% of first-time buyers in 2001). 
7. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 105 tbl.A-5. 
8. ld. 
9. FANNIE MAE, AMERICAN DREAM COMMITMENT 2002 REPORT 10 (2003), 
available at http://www .fanniemae.com/initiatives/pdf/adc/full2002. pdf. See 
also Press Release, National American Indian Housing Council, Native 
American Homeownership: Far Below Other Americans; But Mortgage 
Default Data Shown As Less Risky (Nov. 13, 2002), available at 
http:/ /naihc.indian.com/pr/mortgage-da ta -11-02 .h tml. 
10. See Menna Demessie, National Urban League Reports Racial 
Disparities Continue, at http://www.civilrights.org/issueslhousing 
/details.cfm?id=9727 (July 30, 2002). 
11. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. 
12. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, PUB. NO. P60-221, INCOME IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2002, at 3 (2003). 
13. Id. 
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Whether the racial homeownership gap is created by income 
disparities, the lingering effects of earlier discriminatory housing 
policies, or other factors, it has not been closed despite recent 
efforts. 14 Indeed, even though the number of mortgage loans to 
low-income buyers in the 1990s grew by almost double the rate of 
loans to high-income buyers,l5 the racial home ownership gap has 
remained constant since the 1980s.l6 In fact, one study projected 
that, at the current rate, white-black homeownership rates would 
not achieve parity until the yea~ 3666.17 
B. Striving for and Struggling with the Dream 
People who want to purchase a home enter the mortgage 
market by taking out a purchase money loan (commonly referred 
to as a first mortgage) to buy their home. Existing homeowners 
who need additional cash and want to borrow against their home 
can take out a home equity loan (commonly referred to as a second 
mortgage) or a home equity credit line. Though home equity loans 
often are marketed as relatively inexpensive ways to borrow 
money for home repairs or improvements, borrowers can (and 
often do) borrow the entire amount of the equity in their homes 
(i.e., cash out) and use the proceeds to pay for non-housing services 
or products, or to repay consumer debt (often unsecured credit 
card debt).18 It also has become a common practice for "second" 
mortgages to pay off the first mortgage and wrap the principal 
amount, fees, and costs associated with that loan into the new loan 
14. For a discussion of the factors that contribute to the racial 
homeownership gap, see A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2005). See also Keith N. Hylton & 
Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric 
Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 250-51, 
268-75 (1986) (discussing the extent of racial discrimination in mortgage 
lending practices). 
15. DUDA & BELSKY, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that loans to high-income 
buyers grew by 52% while loans to low-income home buyers grew by 94%). 
16. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING 
TABLES OWNERSHIP RATES (2002), at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ 
housing/census/historic/ownrate.html (last updated July 8, 2004). See also 
MASNICK, supra note 1, at 2; JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECON. STUDIES, 
HOMEOWNERSHIP: PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDERS WHO OWN THEIR OWN 
HOMES: 1983-1997, available at http://www.jointcenter.org/DB/printer/ 
homeown.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004); STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 
2003, supra note 2, at 16. 
17. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 14. See also 
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 231 (indicating that minorities show "no 
sign of making up the [homeownership] gap"). 
18. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 108th Cong. 7 (2004) [hereinafter Stein Statement] (prepared 
statement of Eric Stein). 
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thus giving the new lender first-lien status.l9 When interest rates 
fall, homeowners often seek to refinance their mortgage loans to 
obtain a loan with a lower interest rate. In contrast to cash out 
refinance loans (which give borrowers cash, but increase their 
overall mortgage debt), refinance loans that have lower interest 
rates than the existing mortgage (or that allow borrowers to 
change from or to a fixed or adjustable interest rate) are designed 
to reduce homeowners' monthly payments and total overall debt. 
Purchase money and home equity loans can be prime or 
subprime.2o Prime (or conventional rate) loans are made to 
borrowers with solid, essentially unblemished credit who meet the 
lender's underwriting standards and are viewed as less risky and 
more deserving of the lowest available rates. In contrast, 
subprime lending generally is defined as lending that involves an 
elevated credit risk.21 Riskier homeowners (including those who 
are self-employed, have difficulty verifying their income, lack the 
funds to make the required down payment, have impaired or 
limited credit histories, or have relatively higher debt to income 
ratios) must pay higher rates and fees in the subprime loan 
market to compensate lenders for the increased risk of default. 22 
19. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with 
Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home 
Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 524 (2000). Lenders likely demand first 
lien status to take advantage of the protections given those liens under federal 
law. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) [hereinafter DIDMCA] 
(preempting state usury laws that regulate the interest rate that can be 
charged for loans secured by a first lien on residential property). 
20. Subprime loans also are characterized as "non-prime" by members of 
the subprime industry. 
21. Federal Reserve Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Subprime Mortgage 
Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges (2004) (memorializing the Governor's 
remarks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting 
on May 21, 2004), available at http:www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2004/200405211 (last updated May 21, 2004). 
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 28 (2000) (hereinafter 
TREASURY/HUD REPORT] (noting that borrowers who present less risk are 
offered lower interest rates), available at http://www.huduser.org/ 
publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf; Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1265-66 
(discussing increased costs associated with subprime lending). Lenders charge 
different rates, points, and fees for subprime loans and typically do not 
publicly disclose pricing information. Because of this, it is difficult to predict 
with precision when a borrower will be deemed ineligible for a conventional 
loan or which terms a subprime lender will include in the subprime product. 
See Mansfield, supra note 19, at 533-35. See generally TREASURY/HUD 
REPORT, supra, at 27-28 (listing factors lenders consider when determining 
whether borrower is eligible for prime rates); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES ON 
SUBPRIME LENDING (1999) (discussing guidelines federal banking regulators 
use to define subprime portfolio). 
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Subprime borrowers, like debtors in bankruptcy, also are more 
likely: to have had a household member suffer a major illness; to 
have large medical expenses, to have income interruptions caused 
by unemployment; to be recently divorced; and to borrow more 
heavily against their houses than mortgage borrowers overall.23 
Finally, most subprime loans (whether offered by traditional 
lenders or finance companies)24 are non-purchase money refinance 
loans25 and most home equity loans, home equity lines of credit, 
and refinance loans are used to purchase or pay for non-housing 
consumer goods or services. 26 
23. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Consumers: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Staten Statement] (prepared 
statement of Michael E. Staten, Credit Research Center); ELIZABETH WARREN 
& AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS 
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 83 (2003); DEBORAH GoLDSTEIN, 
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING 
PREDATORY LENDING: MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON DEFINITION AND 
WORKABLE SOLUTIONS 31 (1999). Recent research also indicates that 
borrowers with higher loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios are more likely to lose their 
homes and that debtors in bankruptcy tend to have higher LTV ratios than 
non-debtors. See Bachieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 5, at 15--17. 
24. Until the early 1980s, traditional lenders offered most home-mortgage 
loans, typically to customers with prime credit ratings. Finance companies 
and non-bank lenders, which now dominate the subprime lending market, 
wrote few loans principally because of liquidity constraints (which largely 
have been removed because of the widespread securitization of mortgage 
loans). See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1272, 1279 (describing changes to 
home mortgage lending market). Currently, traditional lenders often avoid 
subprime lending because of the risks associated with that lending, the 
likelihood that they will be required to foreclose on property, and because of 
their concern that loan rejection rates that appear to correlate with race will 
subject them to discrimination law suits. Id. See also State of the Banking 
Industry: Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of James E. Gilleran, Director, Office of Thrift 
Supervision) (commenting that subprime lending is not fully served by 
conventional lenders); Serv. Corp. of Retired Executives, Borrowing Money, at 
http://www.scoreknox.org/librarylborrowing.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004). 
25. See Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Serus., 108th Cong. 9, 10 (2004) [hereinafter CFAL Statement] (prepared 
statement of the Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending ("CFAL") and New 
Century Financial Corporation); Harold L. Bunce et al., Subprime 
Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun of Predatory Lending?, in HOUSING POLICY IN 
THE NEW MILLENIUM 257, 260 n.4 (2003) (suggesting that 80% of subprime 
loans are refinance loans); Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 7. 
26. See, e.g., Marianne A. Hilgert & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Household 
Financial Management: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, 89 
FED. RES. BULL. No. 7 309, 310 (July 2003) (indicating that only 35% of 
respondents in the survey reported refinancing a mortgage or loan for home 
improvement); Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 7 (citing research that 
indicates that most subprime loans are refinance loans used to pay for non-
26 The John Marshall Law Review [38:19 
The refinance market, especially subprime refinance loans, 
has grown tremendously over the last decade.27 For example, 
while the total mortgage volume (including purchase and 
refinance loans) in 1990 was $458 billion, the volume for refinance 
loans in 2003 was $2.2 trillion.2s In addition, the number of 
subprime mortgage originations in 1994 was $35 billion but 
increased to $160 billion in 1999, $213 billion in 2002, and $325 
billion in 2003.29 Similarly, subprime originations doubled their 
share of the overall mortgage origination market from 5% in 1994 
to 10.5% in 2003.30 Moreover, the overall number of subprime 
loans increased from approximately 100,000 in 1993, to over 1.36 
million less than ten years later, in 2002.31 
Home equity lending generally, and subprime lending in 
particular, increased in volume and became much more popular 
for a number of reasons. First, due to technological changes, it 
became easier for lenders to assess, or "score", a borrower's credit 
history.32 In addition, most mortgage loans, and virtually all 
subprime loans, are now securitized or sold in the secondary 
market to private investors.33 Indeed, the subprime securitization 
market increased by over $70 billion from 1994 to 1999 and this 
increase appears to have contributed to the increase in subprime 
originations. 34 
housing debt). 
27. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Subprime Lending Report, Unequal Burden: Income and Racial 
Disparities in Subprime Lending in America (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter 
Unequal Burden] (reporting that the number of subprime refinance loans 
increased ten-fold between 1993 and 1998), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/subprime.html. 
28. Holden Lewis, Reasons Remain to Refinance, at 
http://www. bankrate.com/brm/news/refinance/20040 115a 1.asp ?prodtype=m tg 
&thisponsor=refi (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
29. ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNIV. OF N. CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, 
THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A 
DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT 2 (2003); CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 3; 
Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 257. 
30. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 3; Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 
257. 
31. ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW 
("ACORN''), SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 
6 (2004), [hereinafter ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004], available at 
http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=108. 
32. See Dennis Hevesi, A Wider Loan Pool Draws More Sharks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2002, § 11, at 1 (discussing increased use of computerized credit 
scoring); The Condition of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement 
of Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC) (suggesting that household 
indebtedness increased because of market and technological changes). 
33. See Mansfield, supra note 19, at 531-32 (describing increase use of 
securitization of subprime loans). 
34. See generally Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its 
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Changes in federal tax laws also helped fuel the growth in 
non-purchase money lending. Owners who itemize their 
deductions on their federal income tax forms now have an 
incentive to borrow against their homes because the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (''TRA") eliminated the deduction of interest for all 
consumer debt except home equity loans.35 This change 
encouraged itemizers to borrow against their homes to pay off 
existing debt or to pay for non-housing goods and services rather 
than incur additional (or continue to maintain existing) unsecured 
credit card debt. In addition, increased government directives that 
lenders provide more loans to lower-income households 
encouraged home equity lenders to aggressively advertise and 
promote home equity and refinance loans, initially to prime 
borrowers (as second mortgages) and ultimately to subprime 
borrowers. 36 
Efforts to increase homeownership rates among lower-income 
and minority households caused many lenders to drop the required 
average down payment for first-time home buyers from 10% to 3-
5% and some even offer mortgages with zero-down.37 Lenders also 
Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer 
Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Samuels Statement] 
(prepared statement of Sandy Samuels, Senior Managing Director and Chief 
Legal Officer, Countrywide Financial Corporation-one of the nation's largest · 
home mortgages lenders-and on behalf of the Housing Policy Council of the 
Financial Services Roundtable) (discussing practice of selling or securitizing 
loans in its portfolio to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other secondary 
purchasers). QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 29, at 2 (discussing an increase in 
the subprime securitization market from $11 billion to $83 billion). Most 
originating lenders sell their loans to secondary purchasers (including private 
investors and private investors like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and, Ginnie 
Mac) then use the sale proceeds to originate more loans. The secondary 
purchasers either hold the loans or pool them into mortgage-backed securities 
which they then sell to other (typically large institutional) investors. See 
Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1273-74 (describing securitization and the 
effect it had on subprime lending); Subprime Lending: Defining the Market 
and Its Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and 
Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before 
the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Bryce 
Statement] (prepared statement of Teresa A. Bryce). 
35. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99·514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2245, 
2246-49. Congress capped the amount of the home equity interest deduction 
at $100,000 in 1987. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100·203, § 10102, 101 
Stat. 1330-84 to 1330-87 (codified at I.R.C. 163(h)(3) (1993)). 
36. See generally Mansfield, supra note 19, at 522-25 (discussing likely 
causes for the increase in consumer home equity borrowing). 
37. Ruth Simon & Michelle Higgins, Stretched Buyers Push Mortgage 
Levels to a New High, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at D1; STUART S. 
ROSENTHAL, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., ELIMINATING 
CREDIT BARRIERS TO INCREASE HOMEOWNERSHIP: HOW FAR CAN WE GO? 1, 7 
(2001); Farnoosh Torabi, Home Loans First·Timers, MONEY, Nov. 2003, at 35 
(discussing Fannie Mae's Flex mortgage and Wells Fargo's No Money Down 
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made it easier for cash-strapped buyers to purchase homes that 
would have been beyond their reach fifteen years earlier by 
encouraging them to apply for both first and second mortgages 
when they purchased the home.38 Though lower- and middle-
income potential and existing homeowners may have greater 
access to credit due to this democratization of credit, many of those 
homeowners are paying far too much for their housing expenses. 
That is, decreasing barriers to homeownership has now increased 
the number of homeowners (especially low-income homeowners) 
who spend 50% of their monthly income on housing expenses - a 
significant increase from the 30% figure historically recommended 
by private and public lenders. 39 
Research indicates that 80% of extremely low income 
homeowners40 spend more than 30% of their income on housing 
expenses (mortgage, property taxes, and insurance) and that 60% 
of these homeowners spend more than half their income on 
housing expenses.41 Given the increase in job instability,42 the 
decreased availability of comprehensive health insurance,43 and 
Plus 3% or no-money-down loan programs). 
38. Doing so allowed them to avoid paying the private mortgage insurance 
typically charged when borrowers put down less than 20% of the home price. 
Simon & Higgins, supra note 37. See Exec. Order No. 418 Housing 
Certification, Commonwealth of Mass., Dep't of Hous. and Comm. Dev. (2003) 
(discussing "soft second mortgages" which allow the borrower to avoid paying 
private mortgage insurance), available at www2.massdhcd.com/ 
e418portal!FY03/CommReport02.asp?MN0=163&FY=2003. 
39. LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3; STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, 
supra note 2, at 3, 4. See also Judy Ellen & Feldman McGirt, Am I Ready to 
Buy a Home?, MONEY, Mar. 2004, at 30 (suggesting that lenders prefer that 
housing expenses-mortgage, insurance, taxes and maintenance--not exceed 
28% of gross income and that total debt payments not exceed 36%). While the 
mortgage debt burden has declined for high-income homeowners, the 
proportion of total family income low-income homeowners devote to paying 
their mortgage debt increased. See Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 
5, at 11. 
40. LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 (defining extremely low income 
homeowners as homeowners with incomes less than 30 % of area median). 
41. Id. at 3. A household that pays between 30% and 50% of income for 
housing (including mortgage, insurance, real estate taxes and utilities) is 
moderately cost-burdened while a household that pays more than half its 
income for housing is severely cost-burdened. See STATE OF THE NATION'S 
HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 25-26 (suggesting that 30% of all U.S. 
households have housing affordability problems, that 1 in 7 spend more than 
half their income on housing, and that homeowners now outnumber renters). 
The total number of Asian, Black, and Hispanic lower-income households who 
are severely cost-burdened is more than twice the number of households who 
either are moderately burdened or not burdened (pay 30% or less of monthly 
income for housing). See id. at 105 tbl.A-9. 
42. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 23, at 83 (documenting the increased 
likelihood that an earner will lose a job). 
43. Increasingly, employers are providing reduced (or no) health insurance 
even though medical care expenses have soared. See JOEL E. MILLER, NAT'L 
2004] Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma 29 
increased rates of divorce,44 lower-income households increasingly 
are unable to pay for basic home maintenance or more extensive 
renovations. 45 Because these homeowners can barely pay their 
mortgage debt, they face the prospect of either remaining in a 
deteriorating home or going even deeper in debt by taking out a 
home equity loan to make any needed repairs to their home. 46 
Little data address the extent to which the increased 
availability of credit has helped borrowers buy and retain their 
homes. Some studies suggest that there has been a dramatic 
growth in the number of foreclosures by subprime lenders 
(especially relative to the number of foreclosures by other lenders), 
that the foreclosure rate for subprime mortgages is thirteen times 
higher than the rate for prime loans, and that subprime lenders 
tend to foreclose on loans at a much quicker rate than prime or 
conventional loans. 47 That lenders foreclose on sub prime loans 
soon after they are originated suggests the unaffordability of those 
loans when they were originated. 4B 
COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, A PERFECT STORM: THE CONFLUENCE OF 
FORCES AFFECTING HEALTH CARE COVERAGE 9 (2001), available at 
http://www.nchc.org/materials/studies/index.shtml; Stephanie Strom, For 
Middle Class, Health Insurance Becomes a Luxury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, 
§ 1, at 33 (noting the increase in the number of American workers who lack 
health insurance due to "ever soaring costs and job losses"). 
44. Roughly 50% of all marriages will end in divorce and a recent book 
suggests that middle-class couples have a higher divorce rate than other 
groups. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 23, at 85-86. 
45. LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3. 
46. Id. Homeowners who lack funds to make home repairs place their 
health at risk by continuing to live in homes with lead paint, mold, or broken 
(or hazardous) cooling or heating systems. Id. at 12-16, 22. Though the 
federal government made concerted efforts in the 1990s to increase 
homeownership rates for minority and lower-income households, it has never 
provided funds or tax subsidies to help these owners pay for home repairs or 
improvements. These households must rely either on private charitable 
organizations (to make the repairs) or private lenders (to loan funds to pay for 
their repairs). Id. at 11. 
47. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 263-64. See generally ACORN, 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 9; Dan Immergluck & Geoff 
Smith, Risky Business - An Econometric Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Subprime Lending and Neighborhood Foreclosures (2004), available at 
http://woodstockinst.org/document/riskybusinesspr.pdf. 
48. The quick foreclosure rate in the subprime market also suggests that, at 
least for some subprime lenders, their ultimate goal was to strip borrowers of 
their home equity, foreclose on their homes, and sell the homes for a profit- a 
practice often referred to as a "loan to own" policy. See Illinois Association of 
Mortgage Brokers Backs Important Consumer Protection Legislation, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 17, 2000 [hereinafter Illinois Association of Mortgage 
Brokers] (discussing bipartisan attack on "loan to own" practice), at 
http://www. prnewswire.com. 
0 
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III. THE AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: PREDATORY LENDING 
A. Nature of the Abuse 
The increase in home equity lending has, not surprisingly, 
lead to an increase in the incidence of abusive practices in the 
subprime home equity lending market. Though not all subprime 
loans are predatory, there is growing evidence of abusive practices 
in the subprime loan market. 49 While there is no generally agreed 
upon definition of "predatory," most agree that predatory lending 
generally describes fraudulent practices involving loan 
originations and also loans with terms and practices that use 
inappropriate risk-based pricing.5° Fraudulent or illegal predatory 
practices (all of which are illegal under existing laws) include 
forging loan documents, misrepresenting the borrower's income, 
backdating documents, failing to disclose information required by 
federal or state laws, and inducing borrowers to apply for loans to 
pay for home improvements which either are never done or are 
improperly done. 51 Non-fraudulent predatory loans vary in type, 
but tend to share certain characteristics. 
Predatory loans often have interest rates (including default 
interest rates) that are significantly higher than needed to ensure 
against the risk of borrower default.52 Moreover, some lenders 
49. Subprime mortgage lenders and loan servicers recently have reached 
multi-million dollar settlements based on unscrupulous or illegal practices 
involving subprime loans. See Michael Hudson, Banking on Misery, S. 
EXPOSURE, Summer 2003, at 29 (discussing litigation and settlements 
involving subprime lenders including CitiFinancial and Associates); Daniela 
Deane, Mortgage Servicer Must Pay Borrowers,- Fairbanks Accused of 
Unscrupulous Practices, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at E1 (discussing a $40 
million settlement with Fairbanks Capital Corp., the nation's largest servicer 
of subprime mortgages); Timothy L. O'Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 
Million in Loan Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1 (announcing penalty 
against Citigroup and its consumer finance company subsidiary). Because 
most predatory loans are subprime loans, prime loans rarely are deemed to be 
predatory and predatory lending almost always occurs in the subprime 
market. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 22, at 2, 24-5; JOSEPH A. 
SMITH, JR., N.C. COMM'R OF BANKS, NORTH CAROLINA'S PREDATORY LENDING 
LAW: ITS ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2002). 
50. See generally ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices (discussing 
practices viewed as being predatory), at http://www.acorn.org/ 
index.php?id=754 (last visited Sept. 17, 2004). 
51. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 11-12; ACORN, Predatory 
Lending Practices, supra note 50 (discussing home improvement scams). 
Another home improvement scam, known as property flipping, causes 
potential buyers to purchase a home that has serious (but masked) defects and 
an intentionally inflated appraisal. The scam involves the seller of the home 
with the hidden defects, an appraiser, and the subprime lender or broker. See 
ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 (discussing property 
flipping); Hevesi, supra note 32, at 1 (discussing predatory lending practices 
among the poor). 
52. See Hevesi, supra note 32, at 1 (characterizing default interest rates as 
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finance excessive fees (including single-premium credit life 
insurance53) into the loans and many borrowers appear to either 
be unaware that these fees have been added to the loan or they 
learn about these fees at closing.54 Loans that have mandatory 
arbitration clauses55 or balloon payments,56 as well as negatively 
a "nail in the coffin" because borrowers who already have defaulted on loan 
payments will not be able to make higher payments caused by the higher 
default interest rate). Though disputed by the subprime market, some 
researchers have concluded that the interest rates of subprime loans are often 
higher than necessary to protect lenders from the higher costs associated with 
lending to riskier borrowers. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 258. But see 
Staten Statement, supra note 23, at 5 (arguing that risks justify higher rates); 
Bryce Statement, supra note 34, at 6 (discussing elevated operational costs 
associated with subprime lending). 
53. Credit life insurance is designed to pay off a debt if the borrower dies 
before paying the loan. Single-premium credit life insurance requires the 
borrower to pay for the insurance in one lump sum (instead of over time) and 
typically is financed into subprime loans, thereby increasing the loan amount. 
This type of fee is especially pernicious since borrowers often pay for the 
insurance over the life of the loan (since it is included in the loan balance) 
even though the policy itself typically last no more than five years. ACORN, 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 42 
[hereinafter ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002], at http://www.acorn.org/ 
index.php?id=108. 
54. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 14, 31 (discussing manipulative 
pressure tactics designed to exploit borrowers' cognitive biases and convince 
them to sign documents at closing that contain terms different from those 
initially presented to the borrower); Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: 
Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. 
REV. 349, 366 (1998) (discussing behavioral tendencies that cause consumer to 
accept terms presented in form contract). See generally Ctr. For Responsible 
Lending, Abusive Practices: 7 Signs of Predatory Lending (discussing study 
that suggests high numbers of borrowers are unaware that their loan financed 
single premium credit insurance), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
abuses/abusive.cfm (last visited May 28, 2004). Credit insurance can 
especially be profitable to lenders who are associated with the insurance 
companies that provide the insurance. See Hudson, supra note 49, at 32 
(discussing cross-selling and the profitability of credit insurance to one lender 
(Citigroup) because a sister company writes the insurance policy). 
55. Mandating private arbitration forces borrowers to abandon certain 
judicial rights, including a jury trial, appeal options, and the right to rely on 
judicial precedent. Consumer advocates argue that mandatory arbitration 
protects lenders from large jury verdicts that would force them to reform their 
predatory practices. See Hudson, supra note 49, at 42-43. Lenders contend 
that arbitration helps consumers by allowing them to avoid the excessive costs 
and delays associated with the jury trial system. Predatory Mortgage 
Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) 
[hereinafter Zeltzer Statement] (prepared statement of Jeffrey Zeltzer, 
National Home Equity Mortgage Association). 
56. Balloon payments require borrowers to pay off a loan balance in one 
payment after making regular payments, typically for 5-7 years. A balloon 
loan often requires the borrower to pay off more than 75% of the principal 
balance of the loan in one payment. See generally FANNIE MAE, TAKING THE 
MYSTERY OUT OF YOUR MORTGAGE (2003), available at 
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amortized loans, can also be abusive, depending on the borrower's 
financial condition. 57 
Mandatory prepayment penalties, which charge borrowers 
who pay off (or refinance) loans early, also are cited as potentially 
abusive. Both consumer and lender advocates agree that a loan 
that fails to disclose the penalty or that contains penalties that are 
"unduly long'' is abusive.58 Consumer advocates argue that, even 
if disclosed, these penalties can still strip owner wealth because 
they often charge up to six months' interest if borrowers prepay 
the loan in the first five years. 59 Consumer advocates also contend 
that the prevalence of prepayment penalties in subprime loans 
and their virtual absence in prime loans suggests that lenders are 
unfairly targeting subprime borrowers.so Subprime lenders 
respond that prepayment penalties often help borrowers because 
lenders can offer them lower interest rate loans because these 
http://www.efanniemae.com/singlefamily/pdf/takingthemysteryout.pdf Oast 
visited June 14, 2004). 
57. Negative amortization occurs when the borrower makes regular 
monthly payments, but the principle loan balance increases because the 
payments do not pay off accrued interest or principal. While both balloons and 
negative amortization can be beneficial to some borrowers (especially those 
who need the low payments associated with negatively amortized loans or who 
intend to sell their homes before the balloon payment is due), lower·income 
borrowers rarely benefit from these loans - especially if they are forced to 
refinance the loan and incur additional points and fees. See generally 
ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 (describing negative 
amortization). 
58. See, e.g., CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 18. 
59. Thus, for a $100,000 loan with 11% interest, the prepayment penalty 
would exceed $5,000. See Seven Signs of Predatory Lending, S. EXPOSURE, 
Summer 2003, at 70. A consumer advocate notes that the $7,500 fee that 
would be assessed against a homeowner who sought to prepay a $150,000 loan 
(with an interest rate of 12%) constitutes approximately 40% of the total net 
worth of the median black family in 2001. Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 
8. Fannie Mae discourages lenders from including mandatory prepayment 
penalties in the loan document unless the penalty is disclosed and gives the 
borrower some benefits. Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, at 
http://fanniemae.com/faq/231001q.jhtml?p=FAQ Oast visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
Two large subprime lenders (Household International and The Associates) 
settled complaints about involving prepayment penalties and Household 
agreed to limit all prepayment penalties to the first two years of the loan. 
Paul Beckett, Household Settlement Boosts Stock, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, 
atA7. 
60. Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 8-9; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY 
AND U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEY., 106TH CONG., JOINT REPORT ON 
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 90 (2000) (suggesting that 
more than two·thirds of subprime loans, but only 2% of prime loans, contain 
prepayment penalties); DEBBIE GOLDSTEIN & STACY STROHAUER SON, WHY 
PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE IN SUBPRIME HOME LOANS 6 (2003) 
(suggesting that 80% of subprime loans versus less than 2% of prime loans 
have prepayment penalties), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
pdf!PPP _Policy_Paper2.pdf. 
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loans are more valuable in the secondary market.61 Moreover, 
lenders contend that they should be allowed to include reasonable 
prepayment penalties in subprime loans to protect themselves 
against the uncertainty and market instability associated with the 
frequent turnover of loans.62 
Certain lender practices are also associated with predatory 
loans. One practice, known as loan flipping, involves repeated 
refinances of the same loan. 63 Another practice, often referred to 
as "asset-based" or in rem lending, involves loans that the 
borrower cannot afford to repay. Consumer advocates argue that 
lenders who engage in asset-based lending focus on the borrower's 
equity in the home and have as their ultimate goal receiving the 
borrower's house, not receiving timely loan payments.64 Because 
mortgage brokers play a primary role in home loan originations 
and originate significantly more subprime loans than prime loans, 
flipping, in rem lending, and other unfair or fraudulent practices 
often involve brokers.65 Indeed, because broker compensation 
depends largely on the total loan amount, brokers have an 
incentive both to place borrowers in high interest loans and to 
pack excessive fees into the loan.66 Likewise, brokers and loan 
61. See CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 18-19 (suggesting that a 
prepayment penalty can lower an interest rate by a full point and that 
subprime borrowers who do not intend to move or refinance in the near future 
would benefit). Indeed, the subprime industry maintains that forcing 
borrowers to bring additional cash to pay points (and, thus "buy down" the 
interest rate) at closing is the functional equivalent of an upfront prepayment 
penalty. Id. at 20. 
62. Samuels Statement, supra note 34, at 11. 
63. See, e.g., Seven Signs of Predatory Lending, supra note 59, at 71. Some 
lenders (or their brokers) intentionally offer borrowers a high interest rate 
loan or one with unaffordable monthly payments to ensure that the borrower 
will need to refinance the loan. With each refinance, the loan amount 
increases because new fees are added (and the borrower often is forced to pay 
a prepayment penalty). Consumer advocates argue that these transactions 
give borrowers few tangible benefits and serve only to strip equity from the 
home. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 44. See 
generally ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 (suggesting 
that lenders start borrowers with higher interest rate loan with goal of 
flipping loan to slightly lower rate that charges additional fees). 
64. See, e.g., ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 
(discussing the broker's goal of obtaining fees and the lender's goal of 
foreclosing on the home then reselling it for a profit). 
65. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 4; Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 
10. See PR Newswire, Illinois Association of Mortgage Brokers, supra note 48 
(suggesting that the majority of home loans are originated by brokers). 
Though borrowers may believe (and may have been told) that the broker's job 
is to help them find the most favorable loan terms, mortgage brokers are 
unregulated in most states and generally owe no fiduciary duties to borrowers. 
Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 10. 
66. Brokers also have an incentive to flip lower rate loans into higher rate 
loans or to pack fees into the loan because of the industry practice of 
compensating mortgage brokers with a "yield spread premium" that pays 
34 The John Marshall Law Review (38:19 
officers have an incentive to make loans with a high loan-to-value 
ratio because most loans are sold or securitized in the secondary 
market. Brokers/lenders have no incentive to determine the 
borrower's creditworthiness or ability to repay the loan because 
their compensation is not based on whether the loan ultimately is 
repaid and, thus, they do not bear the risk of loss if the borrower 
defaults.67 
Another lender practice that is unfair, abusive, and 
discouraged by public secondary purchasers, though likely legal, is 
the steering of borrowers whose income qualified them for lower-
interest (or even prime) loans into higher-cost subprime loans.68 
Steering especially appears to be directed toward elderly and 
minority borrowers.69 For example, while the number of subprime 
purchase loans to black borrowers increased by 686% from 1995-
2001, the number of prime conventional purchase loans actually 
fell by almost 6%.70 Subprime loans constitute more than half 
(51%) of all refinance loans in black communities, but just 9% of 
brokers a bonus if they steer borrowers into higher interest loans. Though 
industry reports suggest that this premium can benefit customers who are 
unable to (or choose not to) pay the "upfront compensation" brokers require for 
any particular loan, there is no evidence that borrowers who pay a yield 
spread premium (and, necessarily, pay higher interest) are offered loans that 
have more favorable overall terms than the loans offered to borrowers whose 
brokers did not receive a yield spread premium. Compare CFAL Statement, 
supra note 25, at 17 (advocating benefits to consumer of the yield spread 
premium) with ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 41 
(explaining that yield spread premiums harm borrowers, while the borrowers 
think that are securing the best possible loan). 
67. Loans that exceed the value of the borrower's home leave the borrower 
"upside down", i.e., the borrower owes more than the home is worth. These 
loans harm borrowers if the lender forecloses on the home or the borrower 
deeds the home to the lender to avoid a formal foreclosure proceeding because 
the borrower would still owe the lender money. 
68. Fannie Mae has stated that lenders who deliver loans to Fannie Mae for 
purchase must ensure that "consumers who seek financing through a ... 
higher priced subprime lending channel should be offered (or directed toward) 
the ... standard mortgage product line if they are able to qualify for one of the 
standard products." Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra 
note 59. 
69. See generally Bunce et a!., supra note 25, at 260; ACORN, SEPARATE 
AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 2; Michael Hudson, Banking on Misery, 
S. EXPOSURE, Summer 2003, at 37 (reporting a claim by the former manager of 
a subprime lender that admitted to packing the loans of borrowers who 
appeared uneducated or inarticulate, was a minority, or was particularly 
young or old). Elderly homeowners, especially, are vulnerable to subprime 
home improvement scams since they are less likely to be able to make home 
repairs themselves but are more likely to need home renovations to 
accommodate their physical impairments. TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 39, 72; LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 12-13. 
70. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 24 
(describing the growth of sub prime purchase loans) 
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refinance loans in white neighborhoods. 71 In addition, minorities 
constitute a larger overall percentage of the borrowers of subprime 
refinance and purchase loans than their representation among 
borrowers of prime refinance and purchase loans. 72 
For example, in 2000, black borrowers received 13% of all 
subprime refinance loans (compared to their 5% share of prime 
refinance loans) and received 13% of all subprime purchase loans 
(compared to their 4% share of prime purchase loans).73 In 
contrast, white borrowers in 2000 received 70% of prime refinance 
loans, but only 44% of all subprime refinance loans, and received 
73% of all prime purchase loans, but only 51% of subprime 
purchase loans. 74 In addition, homeowners in high-income black 
neighborhoods are twice as likely as homeowners in low-income 
white neighborhoods to have subprime loans.75 Indeed, both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac concluded that potentially 35-50% of 
minority borrowers of subprime loans could have qualified for a 
lower-cost or conventional mortgage loan product. 76 In response, 
71. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31. 
72. Staten Statement, supra note 23, at 2; Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 
258. See also ACORN, PREDATORY LENDING REPORTS 1 (2001) (reporting that 
in 2000, 49.9% of all refinance loans received by black homeowners and 26.2% 
of refinance loans received by Hispanic homeowners were from subprime 
lenders whereas only 18% of the refinance loans received by white 
homeowners were from subprime lenders), at http://www.acorn.org/ 
acornlO/predatorylending/plreports/summary.htm. It is difficult to discern the 
precise racial disparity in subprime refinance lending because lenders often 
failed to report the borrower's race and this failure may mask the actual 
concentration of subprime lending in minority communities. See ACORN, 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 22. The Federal Reserve now 
requires lenders to inquire about the race of all telephone applicants. See 
Press Release, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Release 20 (June 21, 2002), 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press!bcreg/2002/20020621. 
73. ACORN, PREDATORY LENDING REPORTS; supra note 72, at 2. A recent 
report indicates that 28% of all purchase money loans blacks received and 
19.6% of purchase loans Hispanics received were from subprime lenders in 
2002 while whites received only 7.8% of subprime purchase money loans. 
Likewise, blacks are 4.1 times more likely to receive a subprime refinance loan 
and Hispanics 2.5 times more likely to receive a subprime loan than whites. 
ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 19, 35. 
74. ACORN, PREDATORY LENDING REPORTS, supra note 72, at 2. 
75. Unequal Burden, supra note 27, at 2 (reporting that while 6% of 
homeowners in upper-income white neighborhoods have subprime loans and 
18% of homeowners in lower-income white neighborhoods have subprime 
loans, 39% of homeowners in upper-income black neighborhoods have 
subprime loans and 51% of all home loans in black neighborhoods were 
subprime loans (compared to 9% of all loans in white neighborhoods)); 
ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 25 (reporting that 
19.6% of upper-income black homeowners, 13.4% of Hispanic homeowners, but 
only 11.2% of lower-income whites receive subprime loans). 
76. James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in 
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 
36-39 (2001) [hereinafter DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES]; FREDDIE MAC, 
36 The John Marshall Law Review [38:19 
subprime lenders stress that even higher-income subprime 
borrowers likely would not qualify for prime loans because of their 
credit history and debt-to-income ratios, and maintain that they 
ensure that qualified borrowers are offered all available lending 
products. 77 
Finally, in addition to being steered to the subprime market, 
minorities-regardless of their credit profiles-appear to rely 
disproportionately on subprime lending because prime lenders 
have significantly reduced the number of banking locations in 
minority neighborhoods. The absence of traditional lenders in 
minority neighborhoods may lead minorities to conclude that they 
would not qualify for a prime mortgage product. Moreover, the 
remaining vestiges of discriminatory lending practices may 
prevent minorities from receiving prime loans, thereby forcing 
them into the higher cost subprime market. 78 
B. Regulatory Responses to the Abuse 
1. State and Federal Legislation 
Most federal and state legislation that regulates predatory 
lending practices essentially is a form of price control laws. The 
oldest federal legislation, the Homeownership and Equity 
Protection Act of 1994 ("HOEPA"), applies to home equity (not 
purchase money) loans and mandates additional restrictions and 
disclosures for home equity or refinance loans that have interest 
AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER AND 
FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES 2 (1996). 
77. ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50. Consumer 
advocates dispute the claim that minority, low-income, and elderly borrowers 
appropriately are steered to the subprime market by citing research that 
indicates that loans to lower-income customers perform at levels similar to 
loans to upper-income customers (especially when prepayment risk is taken 
into account). See Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, Performance of Low-
Income and Minority Mortgages, in LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: 
EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 324 (Nicolas Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds., 
2002). 
78. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 258; James H. Carr & Jenny Schuetz, 
Financial Services in Distressed Communities: Framing the Issues, Finding 
Solutions, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND 
ANSWERS 5, 7 (2001) (arguing that racial and economic disparities in subprime 
lending cannot be justified by borrower creditworthiness alone); ACORN, 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 34 (discussing racially 
discriminatory lending practices and lender abandonment of low-income and 
minority neighborhoods); Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing 
and Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 354 
(2003) (suggesting that the banking industry's failure to advertise or 
otherwise market to minorities may depress minority homeownership rates). 
See generally JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, 
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 81-84 (1994). 
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rates or fees that exceed a certain statutorily defined threshold. 79 
HOEPA imposes limitations on prepayment penalties, default 
interest rates, balloon payments, loan flipping, asset-based 
lending, and negative amortizations.80 Many lenders appear to 
avoid making loans covered by HOEPA because of both the stigma 
associated with making high-cost loans and the decreased value of 
those loans in the secondary market.Bl 
In response to reported cases of subprime lending abuses 
(notwithstanding HOEPA safeguards), North Carolina became the 
first state to adopt consumer protection legislation that regulates 
"high-cost" loans.s2 The law prevents high-cost loans from 
including balloon payments, higher post-default interest rates, 
negative amortization, certain prepayment and third-party fees, 
and prevents them from financing single-premium credit 
insurance or offering to a borrower whose debt-to-income ratio 
exceeds 50%.83 This law also curtails lenders' ability to flip loans 
and mandates that borrowers who take out high-cost loans receive 
homeownership counseling.84 Other states have also enacted anti-
predatory lending legislation that either prohibits or severely 
regulates some (or all) loan terms viewed as predatory, including 
the financing of single-premium credit insurance (or debt 
cancellation, or debt suspension agreements), balloon payments, 
negative amortization, default interest rates, prepayment 
penalties, and asset-based lending.85 
79. HOEPA applies to first mortgage refinance loans if the annual 
percentage rate ("APR") is more than 8% of the rate for Treasury securities 
with a comparable maturity date. The APR interest rate trigger for second 
mortgages or home equity loans is 10%. If the points or fees the borrower pays 
exceed the greater of 8% of the loan amount or a flat fee (which is adjusted 
annually based on the Consumer Price Index), HOEPA also applies. Reg. Z, 
12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2004). 
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)-(i) (2000); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32. 
81. See Bryce Statement, supra note 34, at 10 (noting that members of the 
Mortgage Brokers Association avoid making HOEPA-covered loans because 
they are viewed as predatory and because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refuse 
to purchase HOEPA-covered loans). 
82. High cost loans generally are defined as those that charge either 
interest that exceeds Treasury bill rates by specified percentages or loans 
whose points and fees exceed a certain percentage of the loan amount 
(excluding certain legitimate fees, such as appraisal or title insurance). 
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE INITIATIVES TO BATTLE 
PREDATORY LENDING 10 (2002), available at http://www.csbs.org/ 
government/regulatory/pred_lending/pl_initiatives.pdf. 
83. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 24-l.lE (1999). 
84. QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 29, at 7, 25. 
85. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970-4979.8 (West 2002); District of 
Columbia Home Loan Protection Act of 2002, D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 26-1151.01-
26-1155.01 (2002); Colorado Equity Protection Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.5-
101-5.3.5-303 (2002); MAss REGS. CODE tit. 209 § 32.32 (2002); High Cost 
Loan Regulation, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, §§ 41.1-41.11 (2001); 
New Jersey Homeownership Security Act of 2002, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:10b-
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After the North Carolina legislation was enacted, the number 
of subprime refinance loans made in that state decreased, causing 
some to argue that the law reduced the supply of credit available 
for lower and middle-income home buyers and has increased the 
cost of the available credit.s6 In contrast, consumer advocates 
maintain that the decrease can be attributed to a decline in ''bad" 
refinance loans, i.e., those that contain balloon payments or 
prepayment penalties exceeding three years, and loans with loan-
to-value ratios exceeding 110%. In addition, consumer advocates 
note that while there was a decrease in subprime loans to 
customers whose credit scores suggest that they could qualify for 
prime loans and an overall decrease in refinance loans, there was 
an overall increase in prime loans to those customers and an 
increase in purchase money loan originations.87 In essence, 
consumer advocates argue, the decrease in subprime refinance 
loans proves that the law was achieving its intended effect of 
preventing lenders from engaging in predatory lending practices.88 
2. Critiques of Legislation 
a. Preemption 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the 
federal agency principally responsible for regulating and 
supervising federally chartered banks, 89 recently considered 
whether banks with federal charters can be regulated by state 
predatory lending laws. The OCC ruled that federal law preempts 
state consumer protection laws because of its view that those laws 
encroach on the federal government's authority to regulate the 
lending terms of federally chartered (or insured) banking 
22-46:10B-35 (West 2004); Illinois High Risk Home Loan Act, 815 ILL COMP. 
STAT. 137/1-137/900 (2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 494.0079(g) (2001); New Mexico 
Home Loan Protection Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-14 (Michie 2004); 
Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN.§§ 7-6a-1-7-6a-13 (2003). 
86. See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL E. STATEN, REGULATION OF 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S 
PREDATORY LENDING LAW 1 (2002); GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL E. 
STATEN, AN UPDATE ON NORTH CAROLINA'S HIGH-COST MORTGAGE LAW 
(2003) (hereinafter ELLIEHAUSEN & STATEN, UPDATE ON NORTH CAROLINA]. 
87. QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 29, at 12-18. 
88. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Butts Statement] (prepared 
statement of George Butts, ACORN Housing Corporation); QUERCIA ET AL., 
supra note 29, at 19-21. 
89. Other federal agencies with oversight are the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve System and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision. 
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institutions.90 The OCC also maintains that state laws are 
unnecessary because existing OCC anti-predatory lending laws 
adequately protect consumers.91 Not surprisingly, the subprime 
lending industry supports the OCC ruling, contending that the 
overly restrictive patchwork of state laws creates confusion and 
leads to a balkanized environment which generally disrupts the 
national mortgage system and erodes investor confidence in (and 
thus the value of) securitized or pooled subprime loans in the 
secondary mortgage market.92 Moreover, lenders maintain that 
this balkanization of credit will increase the cost of, and decrease 
the availability of, credit for borrowers with less than prime credit 
profiles, thus harming the people who should be helped by the 
legislation.93 Moreover, lenders contend that the state and local 
laws are "stealth usury laws" designed to ban certain loans by 
increasing the costs of certain loan procedures and also increasing 
lender (and sometimes purchaser or assignee) liability for making 
those loans. 94 
Critics of the OCC ruling argue that it is ill-conceived because 
it effectively prevents states from using their laws to protect their 
citizens from predatory lending practices and because, in any 
event, only Congress (not a regulatory agency) should preempt 
state laws and regulations.95 Critics also dispute lenders' claims 
90. See Oversight of Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 18--19 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hawke, Jr. Statement] (prepared statement of John D. Hawke, Jr, Comptroller 
of the Currency) (discussing the preemption rule and longstanding precedent 
to operate under uniform federal standards). 
91. See id. at 20-21; OCC Takes on Abusive Loans in Texas In First Case to 
Allege "Unfair" Lending, 72 U.S. L. WK. 18 (2003) (suggesting that OCC's 
settlement with subprime lender for unfair (but not deceptive) practice 
indicates OCC's ability to protect consumers). 
92. See Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 108th Cong. 5 (2004) [hereinafter Calomiris Statement] (prepared 
statement of Charles W. Calomiris); Bryce Statement, supra note 34, at 3. 
93. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 26. See also ELLIEHAUSEN & 
STATEN, UPDATE ON NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 86. 
94. Calomiris Statement, supra note 92, at 5; Bryce Statement, supra note 
34, at 13. 
95. The Office of Thrift Supervision also ruled that federal savings 
associations are exempt from state anti-predatory lending laws. Mark 
Fogarty, Fed Charters Supercede State's in Predatory Lending, N.M. B. WKLY, 
Sept. 12, 2003, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/ 
stories/2003/09/15/story5.html. See generally Hearing on Oversight of Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (prepared statement of the Honorable Peter T. 
King) (questioning OCC authority to preempt state laws); Hearing on 
Oversight of Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (prepared statement of the 
Honorable Rahm Emanuel) (same). · 
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that complying with state consumer protection laws will 
necessarily increase the cost of credit. Because most subprime 
mortgages are originated by state-licensed mortgage companies, 
costs should not significantly increase since state entities should 
be expected to know their own state laws and generally would not 
need to understand the laws of other states.96 Moreover, because 
states can more quickly respond to abusive real estate lending 
practices involving their citizens, critics maintain that in the long 
run federal preemption will harm consumers.97 
b. Controversy over Scope of "Predatory'' 
Critics also contend that state predatory lending laws are 
vague and overbroad, citing the sharp disagreement over which 
loan features or lender practices should be deemed abusive or 
"predatory." Both consumer advocates and lenders agree that 
illegal or fraudulent practices (including forging documents or 
misrepresenting the features included in a loan) constitute 
predatory lending practices. Moreover, most now appear to agree 
that single-premium credit insurance, high-interest default 
interest rates, asset-based lending, and loan flipping generally are 
abusive.98 However, lenders refute suggestions that balloon 
0 
payments and prepayment penalties are per se abusive because of 
their view that these loan terms can help borrowers who want low 
initial payments (which balloons provide) or lower interest rates 
(which prepayment penalties give to borrowers who do not repay 
their loans early).99 Likewise, lending industry spokespersons 
96. See, e.g., CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 4 (characterizing the 
subprime market as primarily local); Subprime Lending: Defining the Market 
and Its Customers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and 
Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before 
the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 9 (2004) (prepared statement of 
William M. Dana, American Bankers Association) (recognizing that "real 
estate lending is in many ways a local issue"). 
97. See Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Mortgage Lending 
While Preserving Access to Credit: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
Insts. and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. 
Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 7, 14-15 
(2003) [hereinafter Brown Statement] (prepared statement of George Brown) 
(detailing superiority of state regulators to protect consumers against 
predatory lending). 
98. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 22; SMITH, supra note 49, at 1. Of 
course, some lenders may now agree that asset-backed lending is improper 
because of a Federal Trade Commission ruling that concluded that making a 
loan to a borrower who cannot afford the monthly payments constitutes an 
unfair and deceptive act and practice. Predatory Lending Practices in the 
Home-Equity Lending Market: Hearing Before the Cal. State Assembly Comm. 
on Banking and Fin., [NEED CA SESSION NUMBER] (2001) (prepared 
statement of the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/ 
predlendstate.htm; 
99. Zeltzer Statement, supra note 55, at 4. 
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vehemently deny that minorities, the poor, or the elderly are 
inappropriately steered to subprime products, citing their own 
data that suggest that sub-prime borrowers are demographically 
similar to the general population and to prime borrowers.l00 
Moreover, even if minorities, the poor, and the elderly 
disproportionately receive subprime loans, lenders argue that they 
appropriately pay more for credit because they are more likely to 
have lower income and credit scores and relatively higher 
delinquency and foreclosure rates.l01 
C. Non-Regulatory Tools to Combat the Abuse 
1. Consumer Counseling and Education 
The subprime lending industry contends that the best way to 
combat abusive predatory lending practices is through the use of 
consumer financial education and counseling programs.102 Indeed, 
credit counseling and financial literacy programs increasingly are 
touted as the most effective way to help consumers avoid unwise 
spending decisions.l03 Consumer advocates are more skeptical of 
the benefits of mandated consumer education for adults104 and 
100. See CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 8-9 (suggesting that subprime 
borrowers are racially diverse, and are approximately the same age as and 
have comparable annual incomes to the general population); Zeltzer 
Statement, supra note 55, at 3-4 (disputing a stereotype that subprime 
borrowers are minority, elderly and very poor); Samuels Statement, supra note 
34, at 9 (suggesting that prime and nonprime customers have substantially 
similar demographic features). 
101. ABDIGHANI HIRAD & PETER M. ZORN, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE IS A GOOD THING: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-PURCHASE HOMEOWNERSHIP 
COUNSELING 13 (Low-Income Homeownership Working Paper Series No. 01.4, 
2001); Staten Statement, supra note 23, at 14---15. Elderly homeowners appear 
to be targeted by predatory lenders because they tend to have relatively high 
home equity, but low income, and often have medical or home repair needs 
and often need funds to support a family member. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, 
at 15-17; LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 37. 
102. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 11; Samuels Statement, supra note 
34, at 14 (noting support by Housing Policy Council, which funds more than 
60% of prime and subprime mortgages, for stronger financial literacy 
programs and greater availability of credit counseling); Bryce Statement, supra 
note 34, at 14---15 (noting support of Mortgage Bankers Association, the 
national association that represents the real estate finance industry, of 
consumer education); Zeltzer Statement, supra note 55, at 7 (stating support 
by trade association for home equity lenders for consumer education). 
103. For example, the bankruptcy reform legislation that has stalled in 
Congress for almost a decade would force debtors to receive limited counseling 
as a prerequisite to filing for bankruptcy and then would condition the right to 
a discharge on the consumers completion of a personal financial management 
course. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th Cong. § 106 (2003). 
104. Though consumer advocates may be leery of mandated consumer 
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maintain that counseling and education (without regulating 
predatory lending practices) inadequately responds to predatory 
lending just as crime prevention and safety education (without 
prosecuting the criminal) is an inadequate response to a crime 
wave,105 
There is limited empirical evidence about the effectiveness of 
debtor education or financial literacy and education programs. 106 
The programs that appear to be the most effective in helping 
consumers avoid unwise financial decisions are individualized pre-
purchase counseling courses that are taught in a classroom or a 
one-on-one setting with the borrower.1°7 Unfortunately, most 
credit counseling programs rely heavily on telephone or home 
study counseling or steer clients to internet sites for financial 
information_1°S Given this, it is unclear how well these programs 
education for adults, consumer advocates, industry spokespersons, bankruptcy 
judges, and government officials universally support mandated personal 
finance courses to K-12 students. See, e.g., Marc Perrusquia, Bankruptcy 
Didn't Solve Couple's Financial Problems. They Seek Help to Trim 
Uncontrolled Spending, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 9, 2003, at 
AS (reporting support for K-12 financial literacy program by the Federal 
Reserve Chairman, a nonprofit debt counseling organization, and a bank 
foundation); Bankruptcy Judges Launch Debtor Education Program, 
CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Mar. 19, 2004 (discussing the Credit Abuse 
Resistance Education Program for middle, high school and college students); 
John C. Ninfo, II, Credit Education for Young People Works, 23-5 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 32 (June 2004) (discussing Credit Abuse Resistance Education 
Program that provides education to middle, high school and college students 
and is sponsored by bankruptcy judges and the local bar association). 
105. Butts Statement, supra note 88, at 9. 
106. HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 101, at 13. Cf. MARK WIRANOWSKI, JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., SUSTAINING HOMEOWNERSHIP 
THROUGH EDUCATION AND COUNSELING 5 (2003) (noting that "evidence of the 
potential benefits of postpurchase education and counseling is almost entirely 
anecdotal; very little empirical evidence corroborates their effectiveness"). 
107. Financial Literacy Education: What Do Students Need to Know to Plan 
For the Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Educ. Reform, House Comm. 
on Educ. and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Dr. Angela 
Lyons, Assistant Professor and Extension Specialist, Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Economics) (suggesting financial education reduces 
the likelihood of being financially at-risk but that effective programs and 
services must be tailored to the client's needs). Credit counseling agencies 
may provide less face-to-face counseling because of concerns that borrowers 
would prefer the anonymity of online education or because borrowers may 
have difficulties leaving work to attend classes during regular business hours. 
See Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit 
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the 
Comm. on Sen. Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) [hereinafter 
Dancel Statement] (prepared statement of Bernaldo Dancel, Chief Executive, 
Amerix Corporation). 
108. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR, CREDIT 
COUNSELING IN CRISIS: THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF FUNDING CUTS, 
HIGHER FEES AND AGGRESSIVE NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 8, 19 (2003) 
[hereinafter CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS); Profiteering in a Non-Profit 
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would educate consumers about the risks of predatory lending 
practices since education reqmres more than just providing 
information. 109 
Advocates for greater regulation of the subprime lending 
market can now point to recent controversies involving the credit 
counseling industry to support their view that legislators should 
use caution before mandating credit counseling instead of 
regulating lenders. Consumers, their advocates, and some 
governmental entities have charged existing counseling agencies 
with engaging in deceptive practices, giving improper advice, and 
charging exorbitant fees notwithstanding their tax-exempt 
status.l10 Indeed, some counselors appear to give no budgeting, 
saving, or planning advice and, instead, encourage consumers to 
participate into debt management plans ("DMPs") that require 
Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Sen. Governmental 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of Cuba Craig, CEO, American 
Financial Solutions-a nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency) 
(reporting that counseling and educational services largely consist of 
interactive online class, telephone sessions, and newsletters). Until 1993, 
most counseling was supplied in a classroom or by individual in-person 
meetings. Once Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac required counseling for some of 
its borrowers, the demand for counseling increased, which may have caused 
more agencies to start providing home study and telephone counseling. See, 
e.g., HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 101, at 5. 
109. See generally Hilgert & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 321 (suggesting that 
education requires a "combination of information, skill-building, and 
motivation to make the desired changes in behavior"). 
llO. CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 8-9; MAJORITY & 
MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
108TH CONG., PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE PRACTICES 
IN CREDIT COUNSELING 11, 12 (2004) [hereinafter ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN 
CREDIT COUNSELING]. Because credit card companies and many state laws 
require credit counseling programs to have non-profit status, most credit 
counseling agencies are tax-exempt organizations who are now finding it 
increasingly difficult to fund credit counseling. CREDIT COUNSELING IN 
CRISIS, supra note 108, at 26-27. The IRS has performed audits of several 
large consumer counseling agencies in response to allegations of abuse. See 
Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of the Honorable Mark 
W. Everson); ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, supra, at 31-32 
(discussing audits). One of these agencies (AmeriDebt) recently filed for 
bankruptcy partly because of litigation involving its counseling practices. See 
also Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit 
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the 
Comm. on Sen. Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Puccio 
Statement] (prepared statement of John Puccio, President and CEO of 
Cambridge Credit Counseling Corporation) (deflecting criticisms of tax-exempt 
not-for-profit status of credit counseling agencies by noting that they are 
forced to have that organizational structure); Caroline E. Mayer, AmeriDebt 
Bankruptcy Threatens Settlement, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at E02. 
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them to repay virtually all their unsecured credit card debts.l 11 
There is a fairly high failure rate in DMPs, which is not surprising 
since employees of some credit counseling agencies often fail to 
determine whether the consumer has the means to repay the 
debts, rarely recommend that the consumer would benefit by filing 
for bankruptcy, and often spend as little as ten minutes 
"counseling" clients before placing them in a DMP.l 12 
Even a well designed consumer education or counseling 
program may fail if consumers possess certain cognitive biases. 
Behavioral studies indicate that people tend to underestimate low-
probability but high-loss events because the "availability" heuristic 
111. ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, supra note 110, at 2-3. 
Much of the recent controversy surrounding debt counseling agencies involve 
DMPs. Some agencies now charge consumers monthly service fees (though 
some deceptively suggest that those fees are "voluntary charitable 
contributions") and often charge consumers a one-time initial fee (in an 
amount equal to one month's regular debt payment) to "customize" the DMP. 
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 17, 27; Puccio Statement, 
supra note 110, at 12-13; Jennifer Bayot, U.S. Suit Accuses Credit Counselor of 
Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at C17 (discussing a lawsuit filed by the 
FTC against a large nonprofit credit counselor that alleged the agency charged 
customers 3% of outstanding debts upon enrollment plus a $20 monthly fee). 
Critics note that many DMPs include only the debts of creditors who return a 
percentage of the funds they receive from the counseling agency back to the 
agency (an arrangement known as Fair Share). See CREDIT COUNSELING IN 
CRISIS, supra note 108, at 9-11. This often leaves consumers faced with 
making one payment to the credit counseling agency then multiple payments 
to secured creditors and to unsecured creditors whose debts are not included 
in the DMP. See id. at 24-25. 
112. See Profiteering in a Non-profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit 
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the 
Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Jon 
Pohlman) (former employee of a major credit counseling agency reported that 
the agency pressured consumers into DMPs and discouraged counselors from 
scrutinizing consumer's total financial profile); Profiteering in a Non-Profit 
Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of John Paul Allen) (former employer 
of counseling agency reporting reprimands for spending too much time 
counseling clients and disclosing too much information to clients). Credit 
counseling programs suggest that they have been forced to abandon in-depth 
consumer education programs in favor of DMPs because the credit card 
industry has substantially decreased its Fair Share Contributions and many 
essentially refuse to fund credit counseling services other than DMPs. 
Profiteering in a Non-profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm. 
on Governmental. Affairs, 108th Cong. 12, 14 (2004) [hereinafter Malesardi 
Statement] (prepared statement of Michael Malesardi). This also likely 
explains why credit counseling agencies resist advising consumers to file for 
bankruptcy. CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 25. 
Notwithstanding the high failure rates associated with DMPs, credit 
counseling agencies contend that DMPs themselves can educate consumers by 
giving them a framework both to exercise financial discipline and to learn how 
to devise and follow a budget. See Dancel Statement, supra note 107, at 4. 
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causes people to view an event (like losing your home to a 
foreclosure) as improbable unless the person has recently seen it 
or heard about it. 113 Likewise, once people form certain beliefs or 
make decisions based on those beliefs, they become overly 
committed to those beliefs and are inattentive to, or simply ignore, 
new information (assuming it is provided) that contradicts their 
beliefs. 114 If "anchoring" causes their present decisions and choices 
to be constrained by prior decisions, they will attempt to justify 
prior decisions even if others suggest that those decisions are not 
sound.l15 
A cognitively-impaired consumer who has formed a certain 
belief (e.g. I am a hard worker who deserves the American Dream), 
will be inattentive to any new information (low or no down 
payments or cash-out refinance loans may cause high debt-to-
income ratios that increase the risk of default and foreclosure) that 
contradicts her beliefs whether she learns about this information 
from friends or family, the media, or in a consumer literacy course. 
Moreover, unless the information is presented to her at a 
"teachable moment," she may be unwilling to pursue consumer 
education or unwilling to change her behavior based on what is 
being taught in the course.ns 
Even if a current or potential homeowner participates in a 
consumer education course, she may be over-committed to certain 
decisions and search for ways to justify those decisions 
(homeownership provides valuable tax benefits; cash-out refinance 
loans can help reduce unsecured credit card debt) rather than 
113. See Goldstein & Strohauer, supra note 60, at 7 (suggesting borrowers 
agree to prepayment penalties because of the highly asymmetric position of 
borrowers versus lenders in understanding the statistical likelihood that they 
will pay the penalty). See also Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the 
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's 
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 383-84 (1994) 
(arguing that homeowners likely discount the risk of losing home to a 
foreclosure). 
114. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
11, 26 (1998). See generally Forrester, supra note 113, at 384-85 (noting how 
certain heuristics skew the homeowner decisionmaking process); DONALD C. 
LANGEVOORT, THE HUMAN NATURE OF CORPORATE BOARDS: LAW, NORMS, AND 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
811 (Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No. 241402, 2000); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision making in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2002). 
115. See Rabin, supra note 114, at 26 (noting that "'fresh' thinkers may be 
better at seeing solutions to problems than people who have meditated at 
length on the problems, because the fresh thinkers are not overwhelmed by 
the 'interference' of old hypotheses"). 
116. See Hilgert & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 320 (discussing the challenge 
of teaching consumers about financial management topics using an effective 
method (like one-on-one counseling) at a time when the consumer is most 
likely to "recogniz[e] the value of the information and [make] a behavioral 
change"). 
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accept information that suggests that she needs to change her 
financial behavior. Likewise, even if confronted with information 
concerning financially risky behaviors, consumers may interpret 
that information by incorporating the things that serve their 
personal interests or pre-conceived beliefs, but ignoring 
information that contradicts those interests or beliefs. Similarly, 
the "sunk cost trap" may hamper the effectiveness of consumer 
education programs by causing people to cling to their past 
decisions and then incrementally make overly optimistic but good 
faith decisions (like refinancing mortgages with prepayment 
penalties multiple times, or taking out a cash-out loan to repay 
credit card debt) which harms them once an unexpected event 
occurs (like unemployment, illness, or divorce). 
2. Additional disclosures 
The typical legislative response to abusive business practices 
is to require additional disclosures.l17 Consumers who are given 
these additional disclosures theoretically will be better able to 
make informed choices about the products or services being 
offered. Mandating additional disclosures to combat predatory 
lending practices is problematic for a number of reasons. First, 
even assuming homeowners read the disclosures, they are likely to 
discount any additional disclosures given the amount of paper they 
already receive during a mortgage loan closing. Since even a 
relatively sophisticated consumer likely does not comprehend 
these existing disclosures, the average consumer likely will not 
would benefit from additional disclosures even if the information is 
clearly (and comprehensively) presented.l18 Moreover, given the 
number of Americans who are functionally illiterate, additional 
disclosures - even if clearly written - would not protect them from 
a potentially abusive loan,119 
117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.13 (2003) (requiring 
credit card issuers to disclose the length of time it would take the borrower to 
repay the balance if only the minimum monthly payments are made). 
118. The Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") requires lenders to disclose the cost 
of credit (i.e., finance charges and the APR) to potential borrowers and the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (''RESPA") requires lenders to give 
potential borrowers a standard statement of settlement costs. See, e.g., Truth 
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 2601. Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) (stating general agreement 
among scholars that an "adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read 
the standard terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have 
understood them if he has read them"). 
119. OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 
PUB. NO. 1993-275, ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA 16 (2002) (reporting that the 
percentage of functionally illiterate adults in America is near 21 %); IRWIN S. 
KIRSCH ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY IN 
AMERICA 17 (1993) (finding 21-23% of adults are functionally literate). See 
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In addition, given the cognitive biases previously discussed, 
even borrowers who comprehend the disclosures may 
underestimate the likelihood that they will either default on their 
loan payments or be forced to pay prepayment penalties. 
Likewise, because lenders are not required to disclose credit and 
pricing information until closing, few homeowners will delay a 
closing to try to compare price information (assuming, of course, 
the potential borrower had the ability to obtain useful pricing 
information from other subprime lenders).12o Finally, because 
research suggests that the most effective form of consumer 
education is an individualized, in-class format, even if disclosures 
are clear and understandable, the average borrower will not 
understand (or change their behavior based on) the information 
provided in the disclosure or the risks associated with the 
disclosed term or transaction. 
3. Voluntary Compliance or "Best Practices" 
Many subprime lenders appear willing to adhere to voluntary 
industry codes or ''best practices" and they contend that 
compliance with these guidelines would eliminate much of the 
perceived or actual abuses in the subprime market.121 Developing, 
and offering to comply with, best practices or standards is often 
proposed by industries or groups who face potentially more 
stringent regulations.l22 Thus, some subprime lenders have 
agreed: not to "purchase or offer loans with balloon payments, 
Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. 
& POL 'y REV. 233, 262 (2002) (discussing futility of disclosures for illiterate 
consumers). Making the disclosures clear and meaningful likely would be 
cost-prohibitive and still may be too complex for the average consumer. See, 
e.g., Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at 
the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 359-361 (discussing 
whether even meaningful disclosures would alter consumer behavior). 
120. See Mansfield, supra note 19, at 544-45 (discussing information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and general unavailability of 
pricing information in the subprime market). See generally Lynn Drysdale & 
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two· Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: 
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the 
Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 626 (2000) 
(discussing inequality of bargaining power and information asymmetry 
between consumers and the fringe banking industry, including title pawn 
shops and finance companies). 
121. Zeltzer Statement, supra note 55, at 5 (stating support by the trade 
association for home equity lenders for the voluntary Code of Ethics and Fair 
Lending and Best Practices Guidelines). 
122. For example, credit counseling agencies now appear willing to comply 
with voluntary standards to avoid increased federal regulation of that 
industry. See Dancel Statement, supra note 107, at 4; Malesardi Statement, 
supra note 112, at 8-9. Members of this industry urge Congress to preempt 
state regulatory efforts, arguing that those regulations create a "confusing, 
inconsistent state patchwork of laws and creditor mandates." Malesardi 
Statement, supra note 112, at 15. 
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negative amortization, mandatory arbitration clauses," or single 
premium credit insurance; not to approve loan applications until 
they "verify the borrower's ability to repay the loan;" and "not to 
solicit their loan portfolios within [a year of] the origination of the 
loan" (which, theoretically, should prevent loan flipping)J23 
Voluntary codes, practices, or other forms of self-regulation 
are limited precisely because they are voluntary and do not 
require lenders to comply with the voluntary rules.l24 A member 
of the industry who determines that it is more profitable to engage 
in rogue behavior and ignore or violate the guidelines will do so 
even if most members of the industry comply with the rules. Since 
the rules are voluntary, there is no way to force the rogue member 
to agree to be bound by the voluntary rules. Moreover, even if a 
lender agrees to be bound by the guidelines, it is unclear who 
would have the authority to ensure compliance or how lenders who 
deviate from the guidelines after having agreed to comply with 
them would be punished.l25 
D. Damage to Homeowners Caused by the Abuse 
Existing federal and state laws have not adequately protected 
consumers from either predatory lending practices or legitimate 
subprime lending that place their homes at risk. Homeowners 
with weaker credit histories, large household indebtedness, or 
adjustable rate mortgages are likely to be the most affected by a 
downturn in the economy or rising interest rates.I26 Homeowners' 
higher mortgage debt burdens (whether or not the result of 
predatory practices) have triggered an increase in the number of 
lower and middle-income borrowers who are defaulting on 
123. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 22. Of course, the subprime lenders' 
willingness to "voluntarily" remove mandatory arbitration clauses may have 
been prompted by Freddie Mac's and Fannie Mae's decision not to purchase 
prime or subprime mortgage loans that include mandatory arbitration clauses. 
Freddie Mac Will Not Buy Subprime Loans that Contain Mandatory 
Arbitrarion Clauses, 72 U.S. L. WK. 2342 (2003); Fannie Mae Will Not Buy 
Home Mortgages with Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S. L. WK. 2463 
(2004). 
124. Indeed, even a recently formed coalition of credit counseling agencies 
concedes that self-regulation without federal regulations will be ineffective. 
See MICHAEL BARNHART, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE CREDIT PRACTICES, 
BUILDING FULL FAITH IN CREDIT COUNSELING: AN AGENDA FOR INDUSTRY 
REFORM 8 (2004). 
125. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1338 (proposing legislation that 
requires mandatory participation by subprime mortgage lenders and brokers 
in self-regulatory organizations that would have the authority to discipline 
members who violate the rules of existing law). Cf ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN 
CREDIT COUNSELING, supra note llO, at 23--24 (discussing limitations of self-
regulation of consumer credit counseling industry). 
126. The Condition of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of 
Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC). 
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mortgage loans and losing their homes either through foreclosures 
or informal proceedings.l27 Not surprisingly, the rate of 
foreclosures (especially by subprime lenders) increased when 
subprime lending increased.l28 While some private and public 
lenders now refuse to offer (or buy) loans that contain terms that 
are associated with predatory lending,l29 consumer advocates 
continue to demand increased regulation of home equity lending. 
Current legislative efforts focus on protecting homeowners from 
high cost-loans and eliminating predatory features of subprime 
lending. 
Even if lenders stopped making loans with predatory features 
or if existing efforts that allow homeowners to refinance out of a 
predatory loan are successful, many low income, elderly, and 
minority homeowners will be harmed if they continue to use cash-
out refinance or home equity loans to convert dischargeable 
unsecured card debt into non-dischargeable secured mortgage 
debt.l30 Recent research indicates that financially stressed 
homeowners with high loan-to-value ratios tend to have less 
127. See Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 5, at 13 (stressing that 
homeowners who have defaulted on their mortgage loans increasingly lose 
their homes both through formal foreclosure proceedings and because they 
deed their homes to lenders in lieu of foreclosure). 
128. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 263; Mansfield, supra note 19, at 
554-56 (discussing studies that suggest increase in the foreclosure rate for 
subprime home equity loans). While some suggest that the high foreclosure 
rate for subprime loans is to be expected given the weaker credit histories of 
the borrowers, consumer advocates suggest that lenders create the high 
default rates by making loans borrowers cannot afford. See also Hevesi, supra 
note 32, at 1 (discussing increase in subprime mortgage industry predatory 
lending, and foreclosures). Compare STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, 
supra note 2, at 18-19 (suggesting that record level foreclosures are due to an 
increased share of loans extended to borrowers with weak credit histories), 
with Mansfield, supra note 19, at 541, 553 (arguing that lenders' extended 
loans to borrowers who could never afford to repay the loans). 
129. For example, Fannie Mae has indicated that it will not purchase loans 
that finance prepaid single-premium credit life insurance premiums. Fannie 
Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 59. Many subprime 
lenders no longer require or offer this type of insurance, most likely because 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refuse to purchase loans on the secondary 
market if the loans finance this insurance and because several state consumer 
lending laws substantially restrict the use of this type of insurance. Similarly, 
Fannie Mae has indicated that it will not accept loans from lenders where the 
points and fees charged exceed 5% absent extraordinary circumstances (for 
example, if the larger fee was warranted because of the small size of the loan). 
Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 59. 
130. See Press Release, Mortgage Lender and Community Partners Join 
Fannie Mae to Introduce New Anti-Predatory Lending Refinance Initiatives to 
Help Borrowers (Oct. 15, 2001) (discussing a pilot initiative that would permit 
certain borrowers to refinance out of a high-cost loan into a fixed-rate loan); 
Fannie Mae Announces Seven-Year, $55 Billion 'HouseChicago' Investment 
Plan to Finance Affordable Housing for 500,000 Chicago Families, Bus. WIRE, 
May 15, 2001 (discussing the same pilot initiative). 
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unsecured consumer debt, which suggests that they are 
substituting mortgage debt for consumer debt.l31 Given the high 
loan default rates for low-income and minority households, even if 
the non-purchase money loans are not fraudulent or abusive, 
many lower and middle-income homeowners who take out home 
equity or refinance loans increase the risk that they will place 
their homes at risk in order pay for non-housing goods and 
services,132 Because purchase money mortgage loans help 
borrowers increase their wealth while non-purchase money 
refinance or home equity loans often do not, the rest of this Article 
considers whether bankruptcy laws should continue to provide the 
same favorable treatment to both types of mortgage debt. 
IV. BANKRUPTCY TREATMENT OF CONSUMER DEBT 
A. Mortgage Debt 
Mortgage debt receives favored treatment in bankruptcy 
cases. Even though the debtor's personal obligation to repay this 
debt can be discharged, the mortgage holder's lien on the debtor's 
home survives the bankruptcy. Thus, even if the loan is a non-
recourse loan or the debtor receives a discharge and is not 
personally obligated to repay the mortgage, the creditor can 
foreclose on the debtor's home after the debtor receives a 
discharge. Giving purchase money mortgage loans favored 
treatment easily can be justified.l33 
As an initial matter, protecting mortgage lenders from lien 
avoidance in bankruptcy is consistent with state and federal laws 
that encourage (and often subsidize) homeownership. 134 
Protecting mortgage lenders should decrease lender risk, 
encourage them to keep lending to potential home owners, and, 
ostensibly give them a greater incentive to keep interest rates low. 
When the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was enacted, most mortgages 
were purchase money loans that had relatively low fixed interest 
131. Bahchieva et al., Wachter & Warren, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
132. David Flaum, High Default Rates Found on Memphis Home Loans; 
Number About Twice that of Nation's 6.4% Average, THE COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis, Tenn.), May 21, 2002, at B7 (suggesting that high default rates in 
one city for Federal Housing Administration-backed purchase money loans 
were due to lenders giving out bad loans, loans that are too large for the 
borrower to repay, and abusive loans). 
133. See Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). 
134. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (h)(2) (date) (allowing a deduction for 
mortgage interest); I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (date) (allowing deduction for real estate 
taxes); I.R.C. §§ 1034(a), 121(a)-(b) (date) (limiting the recognition of gains 
from home appreciation). The government also has promoted homeownership 
in the past by encouraging public housing units to be converted to private 
ownership. See Forrester, supra note 113, at 394, 394 n.105 (discussing laws). 
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rates and were heavily regulated by state usury laws.135 Today, 
interest rates that can be charged in the mortgage market are 
essentially unregulated, lenders increasingly make adjustable 
rate, or negatively amortized loans, and federal law preempts 
state usury regulations of interest ceilings on mortgage loans 
secured by a first lien on the home for federally regulated loans.l36 
Though prime purchase money loan interest rates still tend to be 
relatively low, the interest rates of some subprime loans can be 
almost double prime rates,137 
The Code justifiably encourages purchase money lending by 
giving mortgage lenders protections that other consumer credit 
lenders (who typically charge much higher interest rates) do not 
receive. 138 The Code specifically favors mortgage lenders by 
preventing Chapter 7 debtors from reducing a mortgage holder's 
claim by bifurcating it into a secured (equal to the value of the 
home) and an unsecured claim then avoiding or "stripping'' the 
unsecured (i.e., underwater) portion,l39 In addition, a Chapter 13 
debtor cannot strip down the lien to the value of the home if the 
mortgage is partially secured. Some courts also prevent Chapter 
13 debtors from discharging or modifying underwater mortgage 
liens.l40 Recently, however, an increasing number of courts have 
started to treat first mortgages more favorably than wholly 
unsecured junior mortgages. Specifically, a majority of federal 
courts now permit a Chapter 13 debtor to modify or partially avoid 
a wholly unsecured non-purchase money mortgage lien even 
though the Code generally prevents debtors from modifying liens 
on the debtor's principal residence.l41 
135. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1275 (discussing 
expansion of mortgage products as a result of federal deregulation of the home 
mortgage industry). 
136. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (preempting state usury caps on first lien 
martgages); Id. § 1735f-7a(l). Lew Sichelman, Mortgage Discrimination Is 
Alive and Well, REALTY TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, available at 
http://www.realtytimes.com/rtcpages/19991004_discrimination.htm. 
137. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 5. 
138. See generally Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1993) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). By making student loan debt presumptively non-
dischargeable in both Chapter 7 and 13, the Code gives similar protections to 
student loan creditors who also tend to lend at below market interest rates. 8 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1322-05 (Henry J. Somer & Alan N. Resnick eds., 
15th ed. Rev. 2004). 
139. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 412 (holding that a debtor cannot strip down 
a creditor's lien to the value of the collateral); In re Pearson, 214 B.R. 156, 158 
(Bankr. D. Ohio 1997). 
140. See Nobleman, 508 U.S. at 332 (refusing to permit a debtor from 
stripping down an under-secured lien to the fair market value of the home). 
141. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2004) (preventing debtors from 
impairing rights of mortgage lenders in Chapter 13 cases). See also Wade v. 
Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1130 (lOth Cir. 1994) (prohibiting a Chapter 13 debtor 
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B. Other Consumer Debt 
Consumer debt levels are staggering. Consumer debt has 
more than doubled in the last decade and total household debt was 
almost $9 trillion in 2003. Consumers had $6.8 trillion in 
mortgage debt in 2003 and non-housing debt exceeded $2 trillion 
for the first time in 2004.142 In 1990, the average household non-
mortgage debt was approximately $8,500 but increased to $14,500 
in 2000,143 Total household debt is at a record high of 112% of 
disposable personal income.l44 
Credit card debt also has skyrocketed and exceeded $750 
billion at the end of 2002.145 People with incomes below the 
poverty level doubled their credit card debt since the early 1990s 
and the poor now use credit cards more frequently than the 
wealthiest Americans.l46 Typical non-promotional credit card 
interest rates in 2004 range from 5.5% to 19.99%,147 Because 
credit card lending is unsecured, lenders argue that they must 
charge relatively high interest rates for these loans to protect 
themselves against the risk of non-payment.l48 However, unlike 
non-purchase money home equity or refinance lenders, credit card 
issuers are not favored creditors in bankruptcy, even though 
borrowers often take out refinance or home equity loans to repay 
from modifying mortgage lender's rights); Zimmer v. PAB Lending Corp. (In re 
Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting stripping of 
underwater lien); Lane v. West. Interstate Banccorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 
663, 664 (6th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 
122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 
F.3d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In 
re Bartee), 212 F. 3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In 
re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 607-08 (3d Cir. 2000). 
142. Barbara Hagenbaugh, Consumer Debt Loads at Record, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 18, 2004, at lB (citing Federal Reserve data); Economy and Jobs Watch: 
Consumer Debt Increases, Savings Rate Down, at http://www.ombwatch.org/ 
article/articleview/1938 (Dec. 2, 2003); Markets; U.S. Import Prices Rise; 
Consumer Debt Slows, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, Business at C4. 
143. Non-Profit Credit Counseling Organizations: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 
27 (2003) (statement of Michael Barnhart, Coalition for Responsible Credit 
Practices). 
144. The Condition of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. 
of Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of 
Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC). 
145. Eileen Alt Powell, Consumer Debt More than Doubles in Decade, AP, 
Jan. 5, 2004. Standard & Poor's puts the figure much lower, at $412 billion. 
See Hagenbaugh, supra note 142; CardTrak, Economic MO.A.B., Mar. 2003, 
at http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/pastissues/mar03.html. 
146. CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 4. 
147. Cardweb, Find a Card, at http://www.cardweb.com/perllcardlocator/ 
surveyllowrate?o=O (last visited June 10, 2004). 
148. Libby Wells, High-Risk Borrowers Face Sky-High Rates, but Cards Can 
Be Used to Create Good Credit, at http://www.bankrate.com/brrnlnews/cc/ 
19991220.asp (last updated Aug. 14, 2002). 
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credit card debt. 
Fortunately for debtors (since almost all consumer 
bankruptcy cases involve credit card debt),I49 credit card debt is 
presumptively dischargeable. Credit card issuers can rebut the 
presumption of dischargeability only if they prove that the debtor 
fraudulently incurred the debt_I50 Because of the amount of credit 
card debt that is discharged in bankruptcy, non-dischargeability 
complaints based on credit card debt are common and 
contentiously litigated disputes in consumer bankruptcy cases.l51 
Though bankruptcy reform legislation that would make it harder 
to discharge credit card debt has been before Congress for almost a 
decade, the legislation has not passed and, thus, unsecured credit 
card debt remains presumptively dischargeable.152 
149. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 119-20 (2000); WARREN & TYAGI, 
supra note 23, at 77-78. 
150. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). See, e.g., AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer 
(In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 425 (5th Cir. 2001); Am. Express Travel Related 
Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F. 3d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1997). 
151. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Serv., Inc. v. Dorsey (In re 
Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592, 595 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Some courts have held 
that debtors who cannot afford to repay credit card charges at the time they 
incur the debt defraud credit card issuers when they nonetheless use the 
credit card for purchases. In re Cullen, 63 B.R. 33, 35 (Bankr. D. Mo. 1986); 
J.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. W.D. 
N.Y. 1993); Colonial Nat'l Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R. 
26, 27 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1996); First N. Am. Nat'l Bank v. Widner (In re 
Widner), 285 B.R. 913, 921 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); Am. Express Travel 
Related Servs. v. Prieto (In re Prieto), 258 B.R. 518, 525 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2001). Increasingly, however, courts have ruled that credit card issuers 
cannot prevent debtors from discharging credit card debt that they could not 
afford to repay based on the court's finding that the credit card issuers failed 
to properly screen debtors to determine their creditworthiness before they 
issued the cards, then failed to properly monitor the debtor's credit card use 
after they issued the card. See, e.g., AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer 
(In re Mercer), 211 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "the credit card 
issuers' irresponsible lending practices . . . leads to more consumer 
bankruptcies"); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 
B.R. 360, 372 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing discharge of credit card debt on 
grounds that the creditor did not sufficiently investigate the debtor's income 
prior to extending credit). 
152. Once it became clear that most bankruptcy courts would discharge 
credit card debt even if the debtor was over-indebted when she used the credit 
card, the credit card industry lobbied Congress to revise the Code and make it 
harder to discharge debts. See Lou Dobbs, In Hock to the Hilt, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., July 21, 2003, at 36; Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor 
Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1 ("Sponsors of the bill 
acknowledge that lawyers and lobbyists for the banks and credit card 
companies were involved in drafting it."); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, 
Soaked By Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64, (arguing that Congress 
aggressively pursued bankruptcy reform because of campaign contributions 
members received from various banks, credit card companies, debt 
consolidators, and other financial services businesses and because of the 
urging from the credit industry's politically influential lobbyists); Robert 
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In addition to giving unsecured consumer credit card lenders 
fewer protections in bankruptcy, the Code also gives non-purchase 
money, non-mortgage lenders fewer protections than mortgage 
lenders. Specifically, while purchase money and home equity 
mortgage liens survive bankruptcy, the Code allows debtors to 
avoid some non-purchase money secured liens on certain types of 
property_153 Congress allows debtors to strip certain non-
possessory, non-purchase money liens on household goods because 
they concluded that the liens were often coerced, were not needed 
to protect the lender's interest (often because the 
collateral/property had little more than sentimental value and 
virtually no resale value), and because the debtor's cost to replace 
the goods were higher than the amount the creditor would receive 
if the creditor repossessed the goods (which rarely happened).154 
V. PROPOSAL 
Borrowers often use refinance/home equity loans to pay off 
other consumer debts or to purchase non-housing consumer goods 
or services. Given this, the lenders who provide these loans act no 
differently than other consumer lenders and the interest rates and 
fees associated with subprime loans (especially those with 
predatory features) are not substantially different from the rates 
associated with credit card lending_155 Since credit card issuers 
and other non-purchase money consumer creditors have no favored 
treatment in bankruptcy, there is no theoretical justification for 
providing such treatment for mortgage lenders who effectively 
function as general consumer or credit card lenders. Therefore, 
while liens traditionally pass through bankruptcy, liens that arise 
because of a pre-petitionl56 refinance or home equity loan 
presumptively should be voided in bankruptcy and the mortgage 
debt should be treated as a general, unsecured claim.157 The loans 
Heady, Consumers Take 1-2 Punch: House And Senate Legislation Would 
Make It Much Harder for Debtors to Declare Bankruptcy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 
1998, at C7. 
153. 11 u.s.c. § 522. 
154. H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978). Both reports 
appear reprinted in 11 U.S.C.S. § 522. 
155. Holden Lewis, Fed Tightens Rules on Sub prime Lending, Dec. 20, 2001, 
at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20011220a.asp ?. 
156. Loans that a debtor enters into post-petition would not be affected by 
this proposal. Thus, the growing practice of using cash-out refinance loans to 
fund a Chapter 13 plan could continue, though the lender's lien would be 
affected by this proposal if the debtor files for bankruptcy again. In re 
Sounakhene, 249 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Evora, 242 B.R. 
560, 560-62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999). 
157. There may be limited instances in which a loan that was designed to 
lower a borrower's overall debt failed to do so or the loan did not worsen the 
borrower's position in bankruptcy. In those instances, the creditor should be 
allowed to prove that the lien should not be stripped because the loan was 
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affected by this proposal would include non-purchase money loans 
that convert dischargeable non-housing consumer debt into non-
dischargeable mortgage debt by, for example, repaying consumer 
debts or purchasing non-housing goods or services or loans that 
replace a lower interest rate mortgage loan.158 
A. Benefits 
Consumers benefit in bankruptcy by having credit card or 
other unsecured non-purchase money debt rather than mortgage 
debt because, absent fraud, they can discharge the unsecured debt 
and the unsecured creditor has no bankruptcy or state law right to 
take the debtor's home after the bankruptcy. Distinguishing 
between purchase money and refinance/home equity debt in 
bankruptcy, instead of making a distinction between prime, 
subprime, and predatory lending, is consistent with the 
bankruptcy Code's more favorable treatment of purchase money 
debts. Moreover, treating purchase money debt more favorably 
than non-purchase money debt further reinforces the public policy 
that supports home acquisitions. Likewise, focusing on whether 
designed to lower the borrower's payments or that it made the borrower no 
worse off than the borrower would have been absent the loan. For example, if 
a borrower uses refinance loan proceeds to pay for college expenses, the 
creditor should be allowed to prevent the debtor from stripping the lien if the 
lender can prove that but for the home equity loan, the debtor would have 
incurred non-dischargeable student loan debt. Cf. Engel & McCoy, supra note 
5, at 1343-44 (proposing a suitability test that evaluated whether terms in the 
subprime loan provided a "discernable benefit" to the borrower or were 
economically justified). When liens are avoided in bankruptcy, the value of 
the avoided transfer is preserved for the benefit of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551. 
To ensure that the debtor (and not his unsecured creditors, including the non· 
purchase money mortgage lender) reaps the benefit of avoiding the lien, the 
Code would also need to be amended to give debtors a right to exempt the 
value represented by any non·purchase money mortgage lien that is avoided. 
158. Because lenders have "flipped" interest-free mortgages on Habitat for 
Humanity homes and convinced borrowers to exchange those interest-free 
mortgages for high interest ones, debtor homeowners should be allowed to 
discharge the refinanced debt and strip the lien of any lender who flips low· 
interest prime (or Habitat) loans into high·interest loans. See Brown 
Statement, supra note 97, at 7; Perrusquia, supra note 104 (discussing Habitat 
homeowners who almost lost their home to a predatory lender). See generally 
Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1264, 1264 n.19 (discussing lenders who 
convince borrowers to refinance lower-interest rate loans with higher-rate 
loans). Loans that refinance higher-interest loans and result in an overall 
reduction of the loan debt would not be affected by this proposal. Moreover, if 
the lender and borrower intend for the refinance loan to lower overall debt (by, 
for example, going from a fixed rate to an adjustable rate during a period 
when interest rates are falling), but changes in market conditions cause the 
debt to increase (because, for example, interest rates increase dramatically 
after the loan is executed), the lender should be allowed to raise as an 
affirmative defense in a lien avoidance action that the loan was intended to 
benefit the borrower. 
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the loan is purchase money (rather than whether it is high-cost or 
predatory) also avoids the debate over the definition of predatory. 
Making a distinction between the purposes for the loan also should 
help prevent lenders from circumventing the law by creatively 
renaming their lending practices, as some lenders did to avoid 
HOEPA regulations.l59 
Unlike the price controls contained in most federal and state 
subprime lending laws, giving non-purchase money loans less 
favorable treatment in bankruptcy does not ban or otherwise 
regulate the substantive terms of the loan. Instead, it places the 
full risk of non-payment on lenders. The practice of asset-based 
lending indicates that some lenders consciously ignore the 
borrower's inability to repay the loan. Moreover, the high (and 
early) default and foreclosure rates associated with subprime 
lending, and the disproportionately higher amounts of refinance 
loan debt relative to purchase money loan debt held by debtors in 
bankruptcy, suggest that many borrowers cannot afford the 
refinance loans at origination.160 Creating a rebuttable 
presumption that these loans are dischargeable will give lenders 
more of an incentive to carefully screen borrowers into "can pays." 
Giving lenders an incentive to better screen borrowers by making 
non-purchase money mortgage debt presumptively non-
dischargeable also would bolster recent trends in the secondary 
market. That is, Fannie Mae has admonished lenders who want it 
to purchase loans to "determineD the borrower's ability and 
willingness to repay the mortgage debt."161 This policy suggests 
that Fannie Mae, at a minimum, specifically disapproves of asset-
based lending and generally disapproves of any lending that is 
designed to force the borrower to default and, ultimately lose the 
home in a formal insolvency proceeding (or deed the home to the 
lender).162 Fannie Mae's action also suggests it understands that 
159. To avoid HOEPA regulations, some lenders kept rates under the 
HOEPA caps but increased the loan by changing fees that are not required to 
be included when calculating whether the loan is covered by HOEPA. See 
ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50. Likewise, after states 
started to regulate single-premium credit insurance and major secondary 
market purchasers refused to purchase loans that financed this insurance, 
lenders replaced credit insurance with "debt cancellation agreements," which 
essentially were credit insurance agreements but technically were not 
regulated by state predatory lending laws. See, e.g., Brown Statement, supra 
note 97, at 15. 
160. See Puccio Statement, supra note 110, at 1 (suggesting that 
democratization of credit has caused consumers to have excessive access to 
overly expensive credit). But see Hevesi, supra note 32 (discussing data that 
suggest that the rate of foreclosure in the subprime market rose while 
foreclosures in the prime market fell); Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra 
note 5 (pointing to data that there is more refinance debt than prime debt in 
bankruptcy). 
161. Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 59. 
162. This policy also somewhat confirms consumer advocates' beliefs that 
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consumers' cognitive biases may prevent them from admitting that 
they simply cannot borrow their way out of the financial problems. 
B. Likely Criticisms 
Some homeowners who seek to refinance their purchase 
money or refinance loans may be affected by the proposal. 
However, loan transactions that are designed to reduce the 
borrower's overall mortgage debt (by, for example, refinancing a 
higher interest loan to a lower interest one) would not be affected 
by this proposal, lenders could prevent their claim from being 
treated as unsecured, and their liens would not be avoided. 
Nonetheless, some will argue that this proposal, like state and 
local consumer protection laws, will decrease the availability of 
credit for the people the laws are designed to protect.163 Lenders 
likely will argue that the risk of having their liens avoided will 
cause them either to increase the costs of refinance loans or to stop 
making these loans altogether. Lenders also might argue that 
making non-purchase money debt unsecured and dischargeable 
will disproportionately harm Hispanics and blacks because they 
receive a greater percentage of subprime loans than prime loans 
and receive proportionately more subprime loans than non-
minorities. 
Certainly, minority homeownership increased significantly in 
the 1990s, at the same time subprime home equity lending was 
increasing. However, most subprime loans are refinance (not 
purchase money) loans and, given the dramatic increase in 
subprime foreclosures in low-income minority communities, it is 
unclear whether a "democratization" or "balkanization" of credit is 
best for those consumers.164 Moreover, even if this proposal affects 
some lenders pressure consumers into accepting certain loan terms (like 
prepayment penalties or credit insurance) or products even if they are not in 
their best interest and even if the loans only leave the borrower with more 
debt. For example, one homeowner reportedly refinanced a purchase money 
loan, and received a subprime refinance loan for $17,398 at a 17.99% interest 
rate. Most of the refinance loan consisted of the debt rolled over from the 
purchase money loan and the new loan included $304 in fees. The homeowner 
received $93.45 in new money. Hudson, supra note 49, at 1. Another 
homeowner paid $1,164 for five different types of insurance on a $5,001 loan 
and another paid $7,242 in insurance premiums on a $34,075 loan. Id. at 33, 
35. 
163. For example, while one commentator argued in favor of allowing home 
equity loans to be modified in Chapters 11 and 13 and suggested that 
homeowners should be able to strip down home equity debt to the value of the 
home (something most courts currently allow, see Forrester, supra note 113, at 
452), the article raises concerns that additional revisions to bankruptcy law 
(including allowing debtor to avoid non-purchase money liens against the 
exempt portion of a homestead) should be rejected because of the impact those 
changes would have on credit availability. See Forrester, supra note 113, at 
454. 
164. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 15, 19. 
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the supply of high-cost purchase money loans, it is unclear 
whether lower or middle-income home buyers generally are able to 
keep the homes they purchase. Indeed, for some lower-income 
households, it may be better for them economically to use the 
income they would otherwise spend on the unaffordable mortgage 
to instead rent a home, save for their retirement or their children's 
college expenses, or save money to help their children buy a home 
in the future_165 
The proposal may, however, hurt homeowners who seek to 
refinance a purchase money loan for a home that they could never 
afford. Though regrettable, existing financial conditions suggest 
that the American Dream of owning the home of your dreams may 
already be beyond the reach of many lower and middle-income 
consumers. Unfortunately, some consumers seem unwilling to 
believe that they cannot afford the home they desire even if the 
"dream" home seems too good to be true, even if they are told 
about the dangers associated with high-cost loans, or even if 
paying their housing expenses prevents them from saving for their 
own retirement or their children's college education.166 This leads 
them to spend more than 30% (sometimes as much as 50%) of their 
household income on housing, which puts them at risk of either 
losing their homes or falling prey to predatory lending practices if 
they have an income interruption or need to make repairs to their 
homes.167 Societal changes, including increased risks of 
unemployment and divorce, essentially require that potential 
homeowners view shelter (whether owned or rented) as the Dream 
instead of assuming that the American Dream consists of a 
"starter" house, then a larger "dream" house later in life. Though 
165. See THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLOTTMANN, HARVARD UNIV. 
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HOUSING AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION: 
lNTEGENERATIONAL IMPACTS 3-4 (Oct. 2001) (discussing the role of parental 
homeownership on the timing of transition for young households to 
homeownership); Dickerson, supra note 14 (citing sources that indicate 
parental wealth plays a crucial role in determining whether and when people 
attend college or purchase a home). Cf Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1359-
60 (accepting criticism that increased regulation of predatory lending may 
cause credit constraints and endorsing the outcome because of the authors' 
view that some loans simply "should not be made in the first place"). 
166. Michael Moss & Andrew Jacobs, Blue Skies and Green Yards, All Lost 
to Red Ink, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, § 1, at 1 (discussing plight of 
homeowners who purchased unaffordable homes in the Poconos). See also 
Paul Gores, Blacks Here Most Likely to Get Riskier Home Loans, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL, May 8, 2003, at 1D (reporting a consumer counseling supervisor's 
concern that people regularly ignore risks associated with high-interest loans 
because of their determination to do anything to quickly buy a house). See 
·also SMITH, supra note 49, at 2 (discussing a borrower's vulnerabilities during 
transaction with a predatory lender, including "low income and/or low wealth, 
financial [naivete] . . . or. . . gullibility," and lack of competition among 
subprime lenders) 
167. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 23, at 83. 
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this suggestion may strike some as paternalistic, changes in the 
labor market now may dictate that the starter 11home" be a rented 
apartment and the final dream home be a modest house that the 
owner purchases after renting for a longer period of time. 
Even if this proposal restricts the amount of credit available 
to potential homeowners and appears to be somewhat 
paternalistic, it will have net positive effects if it prevents 
homeowners from becoming over-indebted and acts, in effect, as 
social insurance to protect them from income shocks caused by 
unemployment, divorce, or medical (or other unanticipated) 
expenses,168 Moreover, these restrictions may help eliminate the 
externalities created when homeowners lose their homes and 
should help stem the damage caused by the dramatic rise in 
consumer debt and foreclosures,169 Stated differently, rather than 
viewing the decreased availability of home equity or refinance 
loans as a harm to homeowners, using the bankruptcy Code to 
regulate non-purchase money mortgages may prevent homeowners 
from placing their homes at risk to pay for the furniture in the 
home or the car in the driveway. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Many refinance and home equity loans, especially subprime 
ones, are systematically stripping homeowners of equity wealth. 
These loans do not enable homeowners to purchase their homes, 
and in fact, cause many to lose their homes. To discourage 
homeowners from converting unsecured debt into secured 
mortgage debt and to encourage lenders to provide loans that the 
borrower can afford to repay, non-purchase money mortgage debt 
should be treated by bankruptcy laws as presumptively 
dischargeable unsecured consumer debt. Even if this proposal 
deprives some owners of the ability to use the proceeds from a 
high-cost loan to make repairs to their homes or to pay off high-
interest credit card debt, it at least will prevent more owners from 
losing the homes themselves. 
168. Id. 
169. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1347 (listing external costs of 
unaffordable mortgage loans, including ''homelessness, dependence on the 
state, and neighborhood decline due to abandoned properties"). 

